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I. JNTRODUCTION 
"Why is there so much ·wTetchedness, 
so much poverty in this fabulous 
land ••• ? Ah, says one -it is the 
priests' fault; another blames it 
on the military; still others on 
the Indian; on the foreigner; on 
democracy; on dictatorship; on book-
ishness; on ignorance; or finally 
on divine punishment." 
- Daniel Cosio Villegas, 
Extremes de America, 
Tezontle, 
Mexico City, 1949 
The central purpose of this study will be to com-
pare the postwar effects of Nationalism in Argentina and 
Brazil on the level and natvxe of United States private 
investment in these two countries. Specifically, we will 
aim for a closer understanding of the impact of Argentinian 
and Brazilian governmental policies on basic United States 
investment decisions and other problems of corporate policy 
normally handled by the parent companies. 
In both Argentina and Brazil the "middle sectors" 
have played a leading role in lifting Nationalism in its 
modern form to the level of a major political ideology~ 
The emergence of this all-important middle sector leadership 
l 
will be given major emphasis. The term middle 11 sector" 
rather than middle 11 class 11 is used here because of the 
essentially economic connotations of the latter in Anglo-
America. In Brazil and Argentina, on the other hand, it 
has only been in recent years that income and wealth have 
vied successfully with learning, prejudice, conduct, way 
of life, aesthetics and religious sentiments as social 
determinants. This new leadership, then, will be studied 
with a view to determining its impact on the evolving social, 
political and economic climate in Argentina and Brazil with 
its resultant effect, in turn, on United States private 
investment decisions. 
While u.s. investments have played an important 
role in the development of public utilities •.• especially 
in Brazil •.. and a more modest but significant part in 
finance, air transportation, retail distribution and mining, 
the most dynamic area of u.s. investments in these countries 
during the period since World War II has been in manufac-
turing for the local market. For this reason, this study 
will concentrate on investments in manufacturing industry, 
with occasional reference to other fields. 
2 
PART I 
NATIONALISM 
CHAPTER I 
1.1 Its Changing Pattern 
Nationalism of an assertive xenophobic nature 
is for all intents and purposes a twentieth century phen-
omenon in Latin America. During the nineteenth century, 
daudillos such as Argentina's Juan Manuel de Rosas often 
manufactured threats to the national sovereignty from 
foreign powers in order to distract attention from unfav-
orable developments at home. But these manifestations 
were sporadic. Nowhere was there what might be called a 
sustained nationalism as part of a national policy. 
The forces that shaped the early destiny of the 
two republics were basically anti-nationalistic. The re-
ligion of the people theoretically transcended all political 
and geographical barriers. Their education stressed 
humanism and sought universal types. Their countries did 
not have long and illustrious military backgrounds which 
could be used to arouse pride in common accomplishments. 
Nor did they have hereditary enemies on their borders 
against which hatred could be focused. Unlike Germany, 
for example, where race consciousness contributed strongly 
to the growth of nationalism, race was little used by the 
3 
leadership of the two republics to exploit a prejudice 
for personal or group advantage. At no time was there 
the cry, heard in Italy in the time of Mazzini and in 
France under Napoleon III, that political and ethnolog-
ical boundaries be made to correspond. On the contrary, 
the intellectuals in speaking of cultural unity employed 
such anti-nationalistic terms as the paradoxical "contin-
ental nationalism."1 
During the relatively brief period that it has 
enjoyed currency, the concept of nationalism has had sev-
eral dimensions as it has responded to stimuli originating 
at home and abroad. It was initially nourished by indi-
viduals acting in a private capacity. In that stage its 
juridic and cultural features were presented in abstract 
terms by intellectuals. The two aspects were often viewed 
as independent.* Not unusually, the advocates of cultural 
and juridic nationalism condoned the alienation of natural 
resources and the granting of long-term concessions of a 
monopolistic nature to foreigners as the price of techno-
logical development. As long as private individuals 
supplied the driving force and the concept remained abstract, 
IJ. J. Johnson, Political Chanfe in Latin 
America (Stanford University Press, 1962 • 
*Economic nationalism commanded only sporadic 
attention at that stage. 
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nationalism was largely devoid of political appeali because 
of the narrow audience reached. 
In Argentina and Brazil during the 1930's the 
State replaced the intellectual as the chief propagand-
dist for nationalism. Under the sponsorship of the State 
two outstanding characteristics of current nationalism 
soon manifested themselves. Its economic aspect was given 
greater stress than its cultural and juridic aspects. 
Secondly, no longer confined to the abstractions of a few 
intellectuals, it was brought down to the masses in its 
dynamic and politically changed form. 
1.2. The Middle Sectors 
Before Argentina and Brazil began the transition 
from nee-feudal agriculture to semi-industrial capitalism, 
the composition of the middle sectors was essentially sta-
tic. They were members of the liberal professions, such 
as law and medicine; they were writers, publishers and 
artists; they were professors in secondary schools and 
institutions of higher learning; they were bureaucrats; 
they were members of the secular clergy of the Catholic 
Church, and of the lower and middle echelons of the offi-
c·er corps. This composition began to change as soon as 
the technological transformations gained momentum and it 
continues to change as the component groups remain fluid 
and as movement in and around them accelerates. Before 
1900, representatives of commerce and industry were not-
ably absent from the composition of these middle sectors. 
The same technological developments that gave the other 
components an opportunity to improve their political 
status also created the conditions for the emergence of 
the commercial and industrial elements -- O\~ers as well 
as managers, applied scientists and highly trained tech-
nicians. 
Numerically, the middle sector formed, until 
well into this century, a small minority. Until 1900 they 
might be described as a thin intermediate layer separating 
the elite from the inarticulate masses; their growth after 
1900 was stimulated by the requirements of technology 
and by the expansion of education and of the functions of 
the State. Even so they remained for the first two decades 
of this century, a small percentage of the total popula-
tion in each of the two republics. The sharp upswing in 
their growth curve coincided with World War I. Since 1919 
their numerical expansion has been large both in absolute 
figures and relative to the other elements of society, 
except the industrial proletariat. Today the middle sec-
tors probably constitute at least 35% of the population 
in Argentina and 15% in Brazil. 2 
2 J. J. Johnson, op. cit., p. 2. 
6 
In the course of the middle sectors' rapid ex-
pansion since the War their ranks have been infiltrated 
by appreciable numbers from other levels of society. As 
long as the demand for their skills rose gradually, the 
increments to middle sec~or positions came almost wholly 
from the middle elements themselves, althoueft occasion-
ally individuals from the elites would drift down and 
become permanent members. Isolated individuals belonging 
to the working groups could and did lift themselves up --
usually via the Catholic Church or the military. Gener-
ally, though, the sons of middle sector families followed 
in the footsteps of their fathers or moved horizontally 
within the middle groups. There was nothing approaching 
the vertical social mobility, limited as it remains, found 
in the two republics today. 
When the members of the middle sectors could no 
longer satisfy the increased demands for skills associated 
with their status, individuals from other groups began to 
bid successfully for recognition. In both Argentina and 
' 
Brazil many naturalized citizens or sons of immigrants 
entered the ranks of the middle sectors as the ovmers of 
commercial and industrial establishments. Others came 
from the old rural families who for various reasons had 
invested in urban industry and commerce. The salaried 
elements teachers, bureaucrats, technicians, managers 
7 
-- drew an important share of their accretions from the 
working groups. 
Clearly, the middle sectors are anything but a 
compact social layer. They do not fulfill the central con-
dition of a class: their members have no common background 
of experience. On the contrary, among them are represent-
atives of nearly the entire cultural and economic range. 
Members of old Spanish and Portuguese families co-exist 
with mestizos, mulattoes, Negroes and newcomers from Eur-
ope. Some are members of the middle sectors bec~use of 
their intellectual attainments; some because they have 
combined education and manual labor in proportions that 
meet the standards of those middle sector elements that 
still look askance at men who depend upon their hands for 
a livelihood; others, more because of their wealth than 
their learning. Some members are strongly committed to 
the defense of personal initiative and private property; 
others may be little concerned with property rights or in-
fringements upon what are often considered the domains of 
private enterprise. 
The differentiations in their social backgrounds 
and economic interests have prevented the middle sectors 
from becoming politically monolithic. Individual members 
have reserved the right to act independently. At times 
large components find the prevailing middle sector atti-
tudes unacceptable and refuse either to exercise the 
8 
suffrage or make ad hoc arrangements with the elites or 
the workers, or both, in order to oppose the dominant ele-
ments. But the differences have not prevented large and 
ordinarily major segments of the middle sectors from find-
ing common ground for joint political action. 
To the extent that the middle sectors have had 
political cohesiveness and a continuity of common interests, 
this cohesiveness and continuity seem to have been due to 
six characteristics they hold in common. They are over-
whelmingly urban. They not only have well above average 
educations themselves but they also believe in universal 
public education. They are convinced that the future of 
their countries is inextricably tied to industrialization. 
They are nationalistic. They believe that the State should 
actively intrude in the social and economic areas while 
it carries on the normal functions of government. 
While it should be remembered that the elector-
ate has been expanded manyfold as the masses have been 
recalled from the political wilderness and brought inside 
the orbit of national affairs,* demagoguery and the cen-
tralization of power not only have survived but may have 
become more firmly entrenched. In the period following 
independence, demagoguery was ·widely employed but it was 
* It is perhaps worth pointing out that in 
Argentina it was the dictator Peron who took the lead in 
broadening the electoral base. 
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directed to a politically sophistic~ted element that was 
reasonably capable of separating fact from fancy. Further-
more, it was of such a nature as to leave the socioeconomic 
structure essentially unaffected. The new demagoguery in 
which the middle sector leadership finds itself involved 
is directed to persons whose minds are ruled more by their 
immediate material needs than by reason. It emphasizes 
social rather than legal justice -- in which the middle 
sectors have greatest faith. It stresses social rather 
than political equality -- which the middle sectors have 
traditionally insisted is the prime requirement for social 
progress. It insists upon a more equitable distribution 
of income and, in certain extreme cases, of wealth. 
The political relationship of the middle sectors 
and industrial labor is also being affected by the changes 
that have taken place in the ownership of industrial and 
commercial enterprises. When political cooperation be-
tween them began, a consideraple share of machine industry 
was in foreign hands. Foreigners also had important hold-
ings in commerce and particularly in transportation and 
foreign trade. Consequently, the foreigner and the for-
eign-domiciled company were made to bear directly a large 
portion of the original financial burdens of increased 
wages and other benefits that were awarded the working 
10 
elements. Under such circumstances the middle sector 
politician could offer himself as a friend of the workers 
and as a watchdog against possible abuses from the for-
eigners. 
The middle sectors have done such an excellent 
job of selling nationalism that they can no longer claim 
an option on it. The ideology is today embraced by all 
the articulate elements, some of whom hold to it more ar-
dently than do the dominant element within the middle 
sectors. In fact it may be that the middle sectors in 
certain instances have assumed -- and in other instances 
in the near future will assume a moderator's role on 
the nationalist issue. In Brazil in late 1957, the then 
Vice President Joao Goulart at a Labor Party convention 
declared that "we (the workers) have de facto authority 
and the legitimate right to exercise the function of the 
vanguard in the nationalistic struggle in which the Braz-
ilian people are involved."3 What Goulart was saying that 
labor must assume the responsibility for seeing that the 
middle sector leadership does not weaken on nationalistic 
issues. In Argentina, too, an exaggerated nationalism has 
left very little room for rational thinking. That small 
space, however, appears to be occupied almost exclusively 
by middle sector components. 
~stado de Sao Paulo, October 4, 1957. 
ll 
1.3. State Intervention 
Statism and middle sector political leadership 
have become closely linked. The middle sectors early in 
their bid for political recognition rejected the laissez-
faire doctrines of the nineteenth century. As a substitute 
they offered planned societies. When their recoF~endations 
were popularized, the middle sectors rode to new political 
heights. 
Social welfare and industrialization have been 
the first concerns of the state interventionists. Under 
the sponsorship of the middle groups the two states by the 
outbreak of World War II had taken over many of the res-
ponsibilities for the welfare of the distressed elements 
formerly delegated to private and semipublic institutions. 
The duties of the State in providing educational facilities, 
medical care, food, and housing for the working groups 
were written in minute detail into the laws of the repub-
lics. Also, "in fulfillment of the State's social functions" 
the governments of Argentina and Brazil took over the 
direction of the labor movement. As a result the laborer 
was encouraged to view any benefits he received as coming 
from the State and to conclude that his well-being and 
that of his fellow workers lay in political action rather 
than in direct negotiation with management. With their 
welfare written into law, laborers have ordinarily pre-
ferred to ally themselves with the groups in power, 
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reasoning that only through support of those who administer 
the laws could they hope to attain what by law is theirs~ 
State intervention in the economic sphere has 
been justified on the basis of three socioeconomic tenets 
upheld by the middle sectors: (1) Industry cannot survive 
without protection from outside competition, and only the 
State can provide this protection, (2) Since the accrual 
of domestic private capital is slow, the State, with its 
ability to accumulate capital relatively rapidly through 
taxation and foreign loans, must intercede in the indus-
trial sphere in order to maintain the highest possible 
rate of development, at the same time that it reduces the 
share of private foreign capital in the economy. (3) Sol-
icitude for the working groups requires that the State 
exercise some control over prices of necessaries. 
Argentina's Peron was a dedicated state interven-
tionist. Before he was driven from power he had made 
major inroads in the sphere of activities formerly re-
tained for private enterprise, and the state had become 
the owner or partner in a wide range of industrial and 
commercial undertakings. With foreign-exchange balances 
built up during the war, Peron bought the French and Brit-
ish owned railroads thereby giving the nation a complete 
monopoly over railroad traffic. He purchased the sprawl-
ing I.T. & T. holdings in the name of the State. He 
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vastly expanded and modernized the Argentine merchant fleet. 
State funds were employed to finance and administer dom-
estic and international airlines. The State engaged in 
a considerable number of manufacturing activities, includ-
ing meat packing and distribution. The State became almost 
the sole source of internal credits for industrial expan-
sion. Through the government trading corporation, the 
Institute Argentino de Promocion de Intercambio (IAPI), 
the State was given the final voice regarding all imports 
and exports. The State exercised close control over the 
labor unions, whose membership rose to a claimed six mil-
lion under Peron. The State replaced the Catholic charities 
as the principal welfare agency. The State was represented 
in the political field by the peronista parties, which re-
ceived financial assistance from the central government. 
Peron had outdone his middle sector counterparts 
in increasing the number of those feeding at the public 
trough. The higher level bureaucrats were telling Juan 
Pueblo what he could buy, see, hear, and they hoped, think. 
The bureaucrats were in turn taking orders from above. 
They were powerless before Peron's controlled press and 
radio, which engaged in character assassination -- one of 
the dictator's more sophisticated ways of ruining those 
who appeared to have pretensions to power. When Peron fled 
into exile it became apparent that he had completely 
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broken the initiative of the bureaucracy, as it did not 
play -- nor has it yet played -- a positive role in the 
juggling of political forces since September 1955. 
In Brazil, under the stresses aggravated by world-
wide depression, the military, as the moderator of civil-
ian disputes, had removed Washington Luiz from the presi-
dency in November 1930 and cleared the way for Getulio 
Vargas' assumption of power. It thereby unintentionally 
had a direct hand in setting the stage for Brazil's enter-
ing a new era, during which over-all national policy smoothed 
the way for the urban middle sectors' successful bid for 
greater power immediately following World War II. 
Nearly all the major decisions ~de by Vargas 
directly affected the urban middle sectors, many adversely. 
Although Vargas successfully circumscribed the decision-
making power of the military, that institution continued 
to be a potential threat to the smooth functioning of civil 
government. Furthermore, the dictator diverted large sums 
to the military at a time when many believed that avail-
able resources might be more profitably employed in other 
areas. Vargas' pledge of "political renovation," which 
had been taken to mean a democratization and a purifica-
tion of political processes, was redeemed when he placed 
severe curbs on the political activities of all civilian 
sectors. During most of his regime the electoral process 
was surrendered; the political parties were abolished in 
15· 
1937, not to be revived until 1945. Vargas arrogated to 
himself the power to determine what should be published. 
He nationalized a number of foreigh~held railroads, but, 
for the most part, he neglected transportation despite 
the fact that a well-developed transportation system was 
a requisite to the sound industrial and commercial economy 
he claimed to forsee for the republic. 
The prospect of being able to obtain trained 
personnel was only one of the inducements that Vargas held 
out to those who might put their capital into the essen-
tially urban branches of the economy. A favorable climate 
in soft and semi-durable manufactures, created by a re-
duced capacity to import following the near collapse of 
the coffee market, was made more attractive by a series 
of measures designed to provide industry with federal pro-
tection and financial aid. The tariff policy of the Vargas 
administration sought to give added incentive to domestic 
industry by increasing import rates on finished products 
and reducing them on essential raw materials and semi-
manufactures unavailable in Brazil. Foreign exchange was 
manipulated to favor the import of capital goods. Numerous 
State-financed and controlled institutes --i.e., coffee, 
cocoa, sugar, tobacco, cotton and pine lumber -- were founded 
to develop those industrial areas most closely associated 
wi.th agriculture. The State-controlled Banco do Brasil 
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was charged with making capital more readily available to 
industry. Meanwhile, labor was kept under strict state 
regulation. 
Commercial and industrial expansion was also 
encouraged by what the State did not do. It did not, for 
example, overhaul the nation's tax structure, which was 
seriously regressive. By keeping the burden of taxes on 
the low-income consumer groups, the accumulation of capi-
tal by those monied elements that might be expected to 
reinvest their profits in the urban sections of the econ-
omy was favored. The federal government failed to prevent 
speculation in urban real estate, a depressive condition 
as far as industry was conc.erned, but one that .over the 
short range contributed importantly to the growth of the 
urban middle income groups. The government's neglect of 
transportation and power development had the effect of 
making funds available for manufacturing, where the demands 
for investment capital perpetually outran the supply. 
A wide range of nationalistically inspired meas-
ures were taken in the economic field to supplant those 
designed specifically to promote domestic industry. Severe 
restrictions were placed upon foreigners and foreign-dom-
iciled companies in the exploitation of minerals, petroleum, 
-- including refining and distribution -- and the devel-
opment of water power. "Progressive nationalization" in 
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key economic areas was written into the Constitution. 
Fiscal revenues were used for social welfare and public 
improvements rather than for resuming payments on public 
debts defaulted before and during the depression. Spec-
ial taxes were levied on foreign companies domiciles 
abroad and on exchange remittances. Vargas began buying 
up the foreign companies that controlled the Brazilian 
railroads, and vii thin a few years the bulk of the present 
federal railroad net was brought under the central govern-
ment's control. The dictator also gave a strong impetus 
to domestic aviation. 
The finest symbol of Brazilian economic nation-
alism as it developed under Vargas is the iron and steel 
plant at Volta Redonda. Begun during the war when plant 
equipment was in urgent demand, Volta Redonda was part of 
the United States' payment to Brazil for the use of air-
strips along the "hump" and at the same time Vargas' pay-
ment to those nationalist military officers who opposed 
his decision to permit the use of Brazilian soil by foreign 
fighting forces. 
The developments during the Vargas era were 
favorable on the whole to the middle sectors; their polit-
ical position, however, was far from secure when the dic-
tator was removed in 1945. Powerful forces from the past 
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remained and a number of them were inimical to the middle 
sectors. Those forces persist in varying degrees today 
and contribute to creating in Brazil probably the most 
confused political climate anywhere in Latin America. 
1.4. Relation To United States Private Investment 
By 1900 the big guns of those who were disturbed 
over the encroachments on the traditional culture patterns 
were aimed at the foreign investors and technicians. 
Whereas a few decades earlier the foreigner had been wel-
comed as the precursor of aggressive materialism, now the 
intellectuals increasingly caricatured him as the harbinger 
of cultural retrogression and as a usurper of the national 
heritage. The United States in particular drew fire. A 
strong United States, extending and consolidating its in-
fluence in the Caribbean and represented by persons who 
refused to live and do business under the rules and laws 
applied to nationals, was much less attractive than the 
one fighting for human rights that the intellectuals of 
the mid-century had held up as a model to be copied. The 
new view was that material accomplishment seemed to be the 
only measure of success the United States understood. The 
twentieth-century intellectuals contended that such a con-
ception produced values that were in many respects the 
antithesis of those goals for which the Latin American 
peoples should strive. Until after World War I their 
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primary objective was to warn the youth of the limitations 
of the way of life the people of the United States were 
pursuing. Paul Croussac, the French-born Argentine his-
panophile, warned of the "'Yankee spirit" within a "shape-
less Calibanesque body," which would substitute force for 
reason, egotism for generos~.ty, quantity for quality and 
would confuse the historical process with material devel-
opment.4 Other invited the young people to contrast the 
"individual brilliance" of their peers with the "stupid 
conformity" that dominated their North American counter-
parts. Vfuen the middle sectors later began to bid for 
political leadership they, too, offered themselves as the 
defenders of indigeneous moral and spiritual values against 
the inroads of "Yankee materialism." 
The growth of industry and international trade 
strengthened the bonds of the leading cities with Europe 
and the United States. Increased contacts meant that the 
cities were subjected to ideas coming from the modern and 
and industrialized nations. The groups from commerce and 
industry were encouraged to look abroad for their economic 
guideposts; those charged with interpreting the culture 
of the republics were made acutely aware of the backward-
ness of their homelands. Their sensitiveness to the outside 
4Quoted in J. J. Johnson, op. cit. p. 27. 
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bound them together and gave them a p:rogressive mentality 
that contrasted sharply with that of the old ruling ele-
ments who clung rather more closely to their Iberian-cath-
olic backgrounds. The lessons learned from Western Europe 
and the United States thus not only served as a political 
catalyst for the middle sectors but helped to crystallize 
their aspirations. 
However, the complexities of foreign investment 
were poorly understood; a sufficient body of evidence to 
gauge its advantages and disadvantages had not been for-
mulated. Granting long-term concessions with monopolistic 
features was seen as the only way to attract vitally needed 
foreign capital into the public utilities field. In any 
conflict of interest between the agricultural and the 
rising industrial sectors, the rural interest in support 
of free trade brdinarily prevailed. Tariffs consequently 
tended to be imposed to raise fiscal revenues rather than 
to protect infant domestic industry. Despite their inab-
ility to comprehend fully the meaning of the coming of the 
foreigners and foreign capital, the middle sectors even-
tually built up evidence that associated the old elites 
with the foreigner in a "vast conspiracy" to prevent the 
immature republics from achieving their greatest potentials. 
In Argentina, foreign economic penetration gave 
an indispensable stimulus to its development as a modern 
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State ••. but it also placed the control of key sectors 
of the nation's economy in foreign hands. Down to Vlorld 
War II this control was concentrEJ,ted to a high degree in 
the hands of a single foreign country, Great Britain, which 
held about 60% of all foreign investments in Argentina and 
was that country's best customer. British investment 
reached their all-time peak of $2250 million5 in 1936, at 
which time they made up 54% of Britain's total investments 
in Latin America. More than 60 per cent of the British 
capital in Argentina was in railways, and nearly 70% of the 
Argentine railways were British-owned. 
The United States, together with other countries 
notably Germany and France -- made much smaller but 
still substantial investments in Argentina. The first 
large investment was made in 1907, when Swift and Company 
purchased one of the principal frigorifico~;* but other 
North Americ8>n enterprises had already begun to do business 
in Argentina by this time -- General Electric in 1899, the 
United Shoe Machinery Company in 1903, the Singer Sewing 
Machine Company in 1905. After World War I the United 
States stood second only to Britain in Argentine invest-
ments and trade. As late as 1938, its investments amounted 
5A. P. Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, 
(Harvard University Press, 1954). 
* Freezing Plant. 
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to only $320 million; but like the British, they were con-
centrated in key sectors of the Argentine economy, espec-
ially in meat-packing plants and public utilities. 
Consequently, while Argentina made considerable 
progress in the formation of domestic canital and the dev-
elopment of internal commerce dt1.ring the inter-war years 
from 1919 to 1939, at the end of that period her national 
economy was still dependent to a high degree upon foreign 
capital, business enterprise and trade. This state of af-
fairs caused increasing dissatisfaction among her people 
in the atmosphere of superheated nationalism generated after 
1929 by the Great Depression. Naturally, the two main tar-
gets of this dissatisfaction were Great Britain and the 
United States. 
In the case of the United States, economic con-
siderations nourished a growing antipathy. Imports from 
this country consisted in large part of competitive manu-
factures and the balance of trade was consistently unfavor-
able to Argentina. It was never more unfavorable in peace 
time than in the years 1925-1929, when Argentina bought 
more than two and one-half times as much from the United 
States as she sold to it. This was bad enough in Argentine 
eyes when the multi-lateral system of international trade 
was in vogue; when that system was broken down by the Great 
Depression, it became intolerable, particularly when 
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Argentine beef was excluded from the United States after 
1927 on the ground of the existence of the hoof-and-mouth 
disease in Argentina. 
The nature of Argentina's early relations with 
the United States helps to explain why, although by 1943 
Argentine investors and businessmen were already in control 
of many domestic enterprises, the Argentine people were 
more than ever impatient to reach the goals of industrial-
ization and economic independence. It is, therefore, no 
occasion for surprise that Argentina, which was economically 
the farthest advanced of all the Latin American countries 
in 1943, put itself in the vanguard of the Latin American 
struggle for economic independence during the next decade. 
In Brazil the role of the urban financial ele-
ments has produced a somewhat different orientation toward 
United States private investment than has been the case in 
Argentina. By 1930 they had gained a large share of the 
control of such commercially produced crops as sugar and 
coffee. In the late nineteenth century, following an ex-
tended period of poor management, crop failures .smd compe-
tition from low-cost sugar-growing areas, the sugar producers 
were reduced to the point where they could not withstand 
the consequences of the abolition of slavery. Soon after 
the end of slavery in 1888 the control of the sugar-refining 
industry of the "hump" began to pass rapidly into the hands 
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of the urban interests, who, before long, also began to en-
trench themselves as sugar cane planters. By 1930 such an 
important share of the growing, refining, and marketing of 
sugar was controlled from the cities that protection of the 
industry had become as much an urban as a rural objective. 
This situation has persisted to the present. 
Urban capitalists were also deeply involved in 
every st,}ge of the coffee industry. Coffee was big busi-
ness. The cost of bringing a large plantation into pro-
duction and providing the apparatus for preparing the bean 
for market required capital ordinarily beyond the means of 
the individual planter. He had to be carried by city fin-
anciers. Once production was under way, the transportation, 
storage and marketing of the bean were activities usually 
carried out from the cities. In many instances urban fin-
ancial interests operated coffee plantations on their own 
account. Politically speaking, this involvement of urban 
capital in coffee meant that when the coffee grower went 
to the government for assistance he had strong support from 
powerful urban financial elements.* 
*We must remember that we are dealing in relative 
terms. The land monopolists in both of the republics had 
depended upon urban financial assistance. In Argentina, 
however, the dependence upon urban capital has not been as 
continuous as it has been in Brazil. Periods of unusual 
prosperity together with the rise in land values in Argentina 
have permitted the agriculture and livestock producers to 
wipe out their indebtedness from time to time. Also, meat 
processing and marketing were primarily in the hands of for-
eigners in contrast with the largely local control of pro-
cessing and marketing of sugar and coffee in Brazil. 
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In so far as the middle sectors were concerned, 
the share of the financial community in commercial agri-
culture had two major political consequences. In the first 
place, since the financial interests had a ready market 
for their surplus capital, they were not inclined to give 
strong support to industrialization, which might upset 
United States and other foreign trade based upon the ex-
port of agricultural commodities and the import of finished 
goods. In the second place, the banking community was 
strongly inclined to align itself with the agricultural 
elements against any arrangement that might threaten the 
traditional political patterns. Thus, unlike that in Ar-
gentina, the Brazilian investment climate was somewhat 
more hospitable to American capital. 
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PART II 
ARGENTINA 
CHAPTER I 
BA. CK GR OtJ.r-.lJ) 
1.1 Effect of Location 
Argentina's location far down in the Southern 
Hemisphere, remote from the great powers of the Northern 
Hemisphere and even from the majority of nations in the 
Latin American group, had a three-fold effect. First, it 
tended to make the Argentine nation psychologically as well 
aa physically peripheral to the great international cur-
rents, whether inter-American, European, or universal. 
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Second, it reduced the effectiveness of Argentina's excep-
tionally strong economic and cultural ties with Europe and 
thus tended to keep the country politically peripheral to 
Europe as \vell as to the American system. Third, it made 
Argentina's power position during the century-long Pax 
Britannica depend largely upon her relations with her im-
mediate neighbors in South America. All of these were we~ker, 
except perhaps Brazil, and, for a time, Chile, neither of 
which offered a serious, sustained threat to Argentina. 
As a result, her power position was generally strong and 
this, combined with the sense of security stemming from iso-
lation, probably explains why Argentina consistently showed 
far less enthrusiasm for international cooperation than 
did many other Latin American countries. 
\~ile, politically, Argentina kept her distance 
from Europe, her strongest economic and cultural ties have 
always been European and their strength increased greatly 
as modern Argentina took shape in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. That, as it happened, was the 
period when the United States was launching the Pan-American 
system. It was also the period when Great Britain'~ long-
standing economic preponderance in Argentina became so 
great that the latter was regarded by many observers as, 
in effect, a British dominion. 
1.2 Pre-War Relations with United States 
Until the twentieth century, the United States 
found little of economic interest in Argentina to compen-
sate for its remoteness. Non-complementary at first, their 
economies became competitive when the United States was 
soon followed by Argentina in the development of commer-
cialized agriculture and large-scale exports of meat and 
cereals to Europe. The United States alone, however, also 
built up manufactures and investment capital on a large 
scale, and in the overseas economic expansion that followed, 
it acquired a substantial stake in underdeveloped Argentina. 
However, as in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, the diplo-
matic record shows Argentina lying largely outside the scope 
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of what was commonly regarded as the typical Latin American 
policy, of the United States. The Dollar Diplomacy of the 
Taft administration reached Argentina only in the limited 
form of "battleship diplomacy" -the administration's ef-
fort to help shipyards in the United States sell warships; 
and Argentina never felt Roosevelt's Big Stick at all. 
Pan-Americanism was another matter, and it pro-
vides one of the major clues to the development of rela-
tions between Argentina and the United States. Promoted 
mainly by the United States, the Pan-American movement was 
at first primarily designed to support its economic inter-
ests in Latin America. Beginning in 1936, however, the 
character of the movement was profoundly altered under Vfash-
ington's leadership, in order to meet the rising t~~eat 
from the Axis, by the addition of political and military 
functions which ultimately transformed it into a regional 
security system. Argentina, which had looked askance at 
the Pan-American movement from the start, but had not too 
grudgingly given it a kind of lip-service during the com-
mercial phase, strongly resisted the transformation from 
its beginning in 1936. This is not surprising, for the 
change not only revolutionized the Inter-American System 
but also cut across all traditional Argentine policies. 
Argentina's resistance, which continued with only 
one brief interruption through 1943 and beyond, created a 
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growing tension in her relations with the United States, 
which had already reached a state of crisis when Peron came 
to power. An analysis of this together with its resultant 
effect on United States private investment will be studied 
below. 
1.3 Peronism and Economic Nationalism 
Extremist groups -- Nationalists and Communists 
increasingly exploited the discontent of the wage-earning 
elements and the uncertainties provoked by World War II, 
until, on June 4, 1943, the Argentine army overthrew the 
civilian government and assumed control of the republic. 
During the months immediately following the coup it became 
evident that the military had no intention of returning 
power to civilian hands. It became equally apparent that 
the decision-making power resided in a highly nationalistic 
and pro-Axis "colonels' clique," known as the Grupo de 
Oficiales Unidos (GOU). By mid-1944, Juan Domingo Peron 
established himself as the undisputed leader of the GOU. 
Peron came from a middle sector background. He had little 
sympathy for what the landed oligarchy represented polit-
ically and economically. Particularly did he detest the 
oligarchy's "subservience" to Great Britain. 
Peron was elected president in February 1946; he 
took office in April of that year, and retained control 
until September 1955. As far as the political life of the 
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Argentine middle sectors was concerned Peron's dictatorship 
was an enigma. At no time in his regime did he feel the 
need of seeking the political support of the middle groups. 
He held in disdain their political objectives and tactics. 
He showered attention and public funds upon the armed forces. 
But his administration also displayed many of the charac-
teristics that have come to be associated with middle sector 
leadership. He promoted education. He favored industrial-
ization over agriculture. He was highly nationalist through-
out most of his regime. He went to extremes in State 
intervention. The total effect of his program was to en-
courage urbanization. But most important, he brought the 
working groups to the surface. The combination of ardent 
nationalism and aroused workers seeking greater social and 
economic justice produced for the first time in Argentina 
a politically charged movement with strong indigenous roots. 
Peron's regime was so patently undemocratic that 
elaboration of the point hardly seems necessary. He meth-
odically destroyed most of what remained of the democratic 
processes and procedures previously achieved. The judiciary 
was destroyed as antiperonista judges were purged. For ex-
tended periods of time the country was declared to be in 
"a state of internal war" and consequently subject to con-
trol under legislation that had the effect of martial law. 
The press and radio were gagged. Political exile was 
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commonly resorted to. Elections were deceptions. While 
Peron did have popular support he simply could not tolerate 
any organized opposition. 
Peron turned out to be a much worse economist 
than most thought possible. It is now clear beyond any 
reasonable doubt that he led the republic to the brink of, 
if not into, economic disaster. It is equally evident that 
the nation will be years recovering from the effects of his 
unsound economic measures. Although he strongly supported 
industrial development, it fared poorly in terms of growth. 
For example, manufacturing reached peak production during 
his era as early as 1948-49. Meanwhile the contribution 
of general services to the national gross product rose from 
50.5% in 1947 to 53.2% in 1954. 6 After 1948 the gap be-
tween supply and demand of energy and fuel remained approx-
imately stationary. Throughout the dictator's regime 
there was steady disinvestment in the transportation sec-
tor of the economy. In the case of the railroads decap-
italization in rolling stock and equipment amounted to 
more than 20% between 1948 and 1954. The mileage of high-
ways kept in "good repair" declined. At the end of 1953 
the average age of trucks in service was probably over 
fifteen years. 
6united States Department of Commerce u. s. 
Investments in the Latin American Economl, (195B). 
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Real wages reached their peak in 1948, when re-
muneration of workers absorbed 59.4% of the republic's 
total income, compared with 46.7% in 1945. Subsequent to 
1949 real income declined steadily until 1954, when there 
was temporary improvement. By the end of 1954 the per 
capita gross production in all areas of the Argentine econ-
omy was barely 3.5% higher than in 1946, and the poor show-
ing was reflected in the earning power of the workers. 7 
In his efforts to drive the "foreign imperialist" 
from Argentina, Peron ran through the entire list of tactics 
employed by the economic nationalists up to his time. He 
raised tariffs. He provided credits to domestic investors. 
His welfare legislation hit the foreign companies partic-
ularly hard. He insisted that certain Argentine imports 
and exports be carried in Argentine bottoms. He bought out 
foreign investors in Argentina's railroads and in some 
major utilities. His rubber-stamp legislature passed con-
tro~s over nondomestic capital which had the effect of 
making the country a .Largely·barren field for further for-
eign investment. The Constitution of 1949, which was written 
at his instigation, contained provisions that made minerals, 
waterfalls, petroleum, coal, gas and other national sources 
of energy the inalienable property of the nation. 
?Ibid., p. 76. 
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As additional evidence of his devotion to Argen-
tine nationalism Peron declared that he would "never" con-
tract a foreign loan. He did, however, as early as 1950, 
when he accepted a $125,000,000 "commercial credit" from 
the United States. 8 Thereafter, there were other break-
throughs. The climate improved somewhat for u. s. investors, 
and the controls over the remittance of profits were eased. 
Most important, Peron in effect acknowledged that the YPF, 
the State's petroleum .·monopoly and the symbol of Argentine 
economic independence, was incapable of developing the 
petroleum industry as fast as was needed. He turned to 
Standard Oil of California. At the time of his fall from 
power he appeared prepared to go through.with the arrange-
ment that had been worked out with that company. 
The armed forces had put Peron in office, and ten 
years later they drove him from office and into exile. 
Those involved in the overthrow knew when they started 
that the defeat of Peron, if it came at all, would be a 
relatively quick and simple matter compared to ending Peron-
ism, which for a decade fed upon unrest abroad and class 
hatred and antiforeignism at home. The machinery of govern-
ment had broken down. The economy had ground to a halt. 
Argentina's standing abroad was lower than at any time in 
8 Ibid., p. 78. 
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a century. But the greatest obstacle to recovery would 
be the profound distrust and suspicion that Peron had en-
gendered in the people. 
1.4. After Peron 
The September 1955 revolution which overthrew 
Peron was led by General Lonardi who was inaugurated that 
month as provisional President of the republic. He promised 
freedom of speech and assembly, liberty for the trade unions 
to conduct their own affairs, and free elections to be held 
in six months' time.9 This latter promise rankled the 
military who would not agree to the return of the Peron-
istas into the national fold. Lonardi was soon obliged 
to modify his policy. 
The anti-Peronista measures taken were quite sev-
ere. Con,gress was dissolved and Peronists. deputies arrested 
for interrogation; people connected with the Peron regime 
were dismissed from the federal and provincial administra-
tions and from the universities, law courts and embassies 
abroad; government commissioners had been placed in charge 
of the newspapers and radio stations. Government, of course, 
was by decree. 
As the anti-Peronista measures multiplied, they 
provoked riots in working class quarters, with the result 
9G. Pendle, Argentina, (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963). 
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that the military junta complained that Lonardi was still 
too lenient to the basically Peronista trade tmions. The· 
dissatisfaction culminated in a palace coup in November of 
the same year. Lonardi was deposed by the junta, his place 
being taken by General Aramburu. 
The proscription of the Peronista party was now 
decreed. Hundreds of working-class leaders, military offi-
cers and Catholic nationalists (Lonardi's party) were ac-
cused of subversive activities and shipped to detention 
camps in southern Patagonia. 10 Some were even shot by f:iring 
squads in spite of the abolishment in 1853 of the death 
penalty. 
Aramburu had promised that elections for the pres-
idency and Congress would be held in February 1958. This 
followed on the heels of an unsuccessful attempt to elect 
a Constitutional Assembly in July 1957. A left-wing group 
headed by Dr. Arturo Frondizi polled 2.1 million votes out 
of 6 million cast. 11 An additional 2.1 million were blank 
and it was believed that most of these were cast by Peron-
istas. Since their party was illegal they had no other means 
of demonstrating their strength. The assembly was dissolved 
without having reached any decision~. 
10Ibid., p. 24. 
11Ibid.' p. 25. 
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Two and a half years "after Peron" the situation 
had not chaneed notably except that the military, on May 1, 
1958, peacefully surrendered power to the civilian elements 
under Frondizi. By that time the prospects of rapid econ-
omic recovery had faded. The nation continued to suffer 
from a lack of domestic sources of fuels and industrial 
metals. Highly trained technicians were in serious short 
supply. Land and capital resources were strictly limited. 
In addition, the republic was in the grip of a virulent 
nationalism made strong by popular support ranging from 
Communist to Fascist, on the one hand, and from working man 
to aristocrat, on the other. This nationalism, it should 
be emphasized, kept the United States investor wary. 
In the economic area, Argentina needed two things 
above all others; a healthy agricultural economy capable 
of earning a maximum of foreign exchange and an investment 
climate capable of attracting large amounts of foreign 
capital. The attainment of these basic necessities to econ-
omic well-being would require long-range planning. But the 
serious economic position of the workers, whose interests 
must enter strongly in the estimates of the politicians, 
made their objectives essentially short range. This meant 
that any long-range effort to strengthen the economy by 
developing agriculttiTe at the immediate price of a signif-
icantly increased cost of living to the workers and the 
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poory paid middle sectors would likely meet strong resis-
tance. Nationalism, in the meantime, has been maintained 
at such a high pitch to this date that it is difficult to 
forsee it being tempered to the point where United States 
private investment capital would be given an opportunity 
to contribute substantially to Argentina's economic resur-
gence. 
38 
CHAPTER II 
GOVERNlviENT POLICY ON INVEST~!mNT 
2.1. Public vs. Private Investment 
Under terms of Law 14,773/58, all solid, liquid 
and gaseous hydrocarbon deposits are the exclusive property 
of the National Government, and private exploitation of 
these minerals is excluded. 12 Coal development is also 
virtually a Government monopoly, partly because private 
capital has shown slight interest in it. Government agen-
cies for petroleum, solid fuels, and gas may call for bids 
and enter into service agreements and contracts for explor-
ation, drilling, pipelines, and planta with national or 
foreign companies or individuals. Nuclear minerals are 
also considered Government property, and regulations simi-
lar to those for hydrocarbons apply. 
Railroad, telecommunications and electric power 
facilities are primarily Government-owned, although private 
investment still exists to some degree in the latter. 
Argentine law does not require that any percen-
tage of the ownership must be in the hands of Argentine 
citizens. However, in the case of a mixed company, i.e. 
with Government participation, the preseident and at least 
12u.s. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Foreign 
Commerce), Establishing a Business in Argentina, (1958). 
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one-third of the directors must be named by the Government, 
with the president having the right, within limits, to veto 
the resolutions of either the board of directors or the 
stockholders. Again, except in the case of mixed companies, 
there is no legally fixed percentage of nationals that 
must be employed in any business enterprise. 
2.2. Attitudes Toward United States Private Investment 
In 1940, according to estimates prepared by the 
Institute of Economic Studies in Transportation, total 
foreign investment in Argentina amounted to about $2,264 
million, of which Great Britain accounted for $1,380 million 
or 60%, the United States (which ranked next), $350 million, 
and Belgium, $250 million. After a decade of war, postwar 
adjustment, and Argentine nationalization, the total for-
eign investment had been cut to one-third the 1940 figure, 
the United States bad risen to first place, with about one-
quarter of all foreign investments, and Britain had dropped 
to second place with about 18% of the total. However, it 
should be pointed out that the U. s. replacement of Great 
Britain at the top had come about through a sweeping re-
duction in the amount of British investments, not through 
an increase in those of the United States. 
In 1953, during the peak of Peron's nationalistic 
regime, an analysis by the United States Department of 
Commerce13 indicated that u.s. :private investors were not 
unduly discriminated against, receiving substantially the 
same treatment as Argentines in such matters as taxation 
and social welfare regulations. But both foreign and dom-
estic enterprise had many things to complain of, mainly 
in relation to government policy. First and foremost were 
the repeated general wage increases, aversging 56% per 
year from 1946 to 1952, which were believed to be the bcisic 
factor in Argentina's accelerating postwar inflation. As 
a result, wage cost per unit of production more than doub-
led in this period; and in addition, fringe benefits in-
creased the cost by another 40 to 50%. As if this were not 
enough, all employers were "solicited" from time -Go t;ime 
for contributions to quasi-official charitable and social 
organization. 
Finally, the government limited the field for 
foreign investment by reserving to itself public utilities 
and the development of natural resources as well as by its 
increased participation in heavy industry and fostering 
more active involvement by Argentines in other branches of 
manufacturing. Local interests already controlled most 
agricultural and livestock enterprises. Accordingly, as 
far back as April 1953 a Department of CoiJ.merce analysis14 
l3Quoted from A.P. Whitaker, op. cit., P. 123. 
14united Nations, Foreign Private Investment in 
the Latin American Free-Trade Area (New York, 1961). 
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concluded that Argentina offered only limited opportunity 
for new investment of United States private capital; that 
this opportunity seemed tcr ·lie in the introduction of 
"specialized products, or technologiC['l.lly advanced pro-
cesses developed in the more highly industrialized econ-
omies"; but that "any appreciable movement of capital to 
Argentina" was unlikely "until the ability to remit profits 
and withdraw capital is assured." 
In the summer of 1953 Peron's government promul-
gated a law designed to attract ne~ foreign capital invest-
ment in industrial and mining projects in Argentina. The 
main attractions were the permission, first, to remit 
profits up to 8% per annum to the country of origin, and 
second, to withdraw the principal amount of the investment 
after ten years in annual quotas of 10 to 20% as author-
ized. Also, in individual cases the government would provide 
subsidies and other aid and grant exemption from custom 
duties. "Industry" was broadly interpreted to include "all 
activity in the transformation of products" and even pub-
lic works. 
Important restrictions, however, were still imposed 
by this law. New investments were to be confined to in-
dustrial and mining enterprises, and must serve the purposes 
of the economic development programs under the second Five-
Year Plan. Each investment had to be approved in advance 
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by the government and made the subject of an agreement 
which, among other thines, would determine the rate at 
which a particular enterprise might make future withdrawals 
of principal under the new general rule. However, two 
highly important questions were not clarified. These were 
the rates of foreign exchange and the treatment to be ac-
corded foreign capital already invested. On the first 
· question the law was silent and a subsequent official gloss 
merely gave a strong general assurance that investors would 
be treated fairly. On the same point the same gloss only 
referred to existing regulations regarding profit remit-
tance. 
On balance, the new foreign investment law of 
that period seemed likely to mark a turnine point in Peron's 
policy, and the turn was toward the right. The law still 
maintained his Third Position* between collectivism and 
capitalism, but it moved this closer than ever before to 
the latter. It was particularly significant because its 
concessions were made chiefly to the United States capital, 
which in the Peronista lexicon had always been capitalism 
at its worst. To be sure, the law was so flexible that 
unfriendly enforcement might reduce these to mere paper 
* Peron described this as a philosophy and denied 
that it committed Argentina to an iron-clad policy of neu-
trality. This explanation seems plausible since in foreign 
as well as domestic policy Peron was ever the opportunist. 
His government flirted with Washington and Moscow but he 
did not marry the Argentine nation to either. 
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concessions, but this was unlikely. Peron was fully aware 
that the United States was his best source for the techni-
cal skills and know-how called for by many of the projects 
he planned. 
Attitudes toward United States private investment 
were further shaped by Act 14,780 of 22 December 1958. 15 
This Act concerned investment of foreign capital and was 
designed to provide special treatment for approved invest-
ments in the form of foreign exchange, machinery or other 
equipment, spare parts and raw materials. Such foreign 
capital must be invested in economically desirable enter-
prises, including those that will manufacture export products 
to obtain needed foreign exchange, or those that will pro-
duce substitutes for items now imported. Investments may 
enter at the free-market rate of exchange and capital may 
be repatriated and profits remitted throuzh the free market. 
Foreign capital under this Act is guaranteed the same 
rights which are accorded to nationals by the Constitution 
and other legisl~tion. New investments may be granted one 
or more of the benefits respecting customs duties, tax and 
foreign exchange provisions, credit facilities and the in-
clusion in the most favorable regime for the development 
and protection of industries. 
l5united Nations, op.cit., p. 21. 
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2.3. Entr~ and Repatriation of Capital 
Foreign capital for approved investments may enter 
Argentina as foreign currency or foreign exchange or in the 
form of machinery, equipment or installations. It may also 
come as spare parts, raw materials, or other forms of con-
tributions, whether imported all at once or spread over a 
period of time to be determined in the case of each invest-
ment.16 
Provisions regarding surcharge or other tax ex-
emptions on imports of capital goods are set forth by 
individual Argentine Government decrees in respect to the 
industry concerned or the individual investment approved. 
Argentina now operates with a unitary exchange 
rate that is not pegged; the quotation fluctuates on the 
open market. There are no controls on foreign exchange 
movement and no restriction on remittance of earnings. Un-
less the terms of the investment contract negotiated between 
the foreign investor and the Argentine Government so state, 
there is no limitation placed on the repatriation of capital. 
The Argentine Department of Foreign Investment 
is charged with studying and screening all investment pro-
posals to ensure that the activities to be created, expanded 
and/or improved are in accordance with the Government's 
16Law 14,780/58, article 2. 
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plan for national development, that they provide sufficient 
technical and economic gu2.rantees and contribute directly 
or indirectly to the earning and/or saving of foreign ex-
change. It is also required to tak~.; any necessary measures 
to verify the foreign origin of the capital, to be certain 
that such capital is not applied to purposes other than 
those specifically approved, and to ensure that the invest-
ment shall not affect the normal development of the already 
existing local enterprises. All potential investors are 
required to submit proposals incorporating the following 
information: 17 
1. Complete data on the foreie;n company. 
2. Amount and origin of capital to be invested. 
3. Purpose of the investment. 
4. Form of the investment. 
5. Market survey - domestic and international. 
6. Detail, description and individual values of 
physical assets to be incorporated from abroad. 
7. Motive power to be used. 
8. Description and values of assets to be pur-
chased in Argentina. 
9. Description of raw materials to be used. 
10. ~ocation of plant. 
11. Program of development and production investor 
hopes to undertake. 
12. Personnel required by categories. 
After the approval of a proposal for new invest-
ment, the executive branch of the Government issues a decree 
officially and formally designating the enterprise, the in-
vestor, the foreign money, the value of the investment and 
17u.s. Department of Commerce, Establishin~ a 
Business in Argentina, pp. 59-70, (Washington, D.C.g?9). 
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other essential facts about the undertaking. Foreign cap-
ital invested in Argentina is guaranteed the same ri~hts 
that are granted to domestic capital by the Constitution 
and national laws. 
2.4. Outline of Postwar Foreigg Exchan~~~tions 
All restrictions on dealings in foreign exchange 
in Argentina, and multiple controlled exchange rates, were 
abolished at the end of 1958. The transfer of funds to 
and from abroad has been freely permitted since that time 
by normal negotiation with banks or others. 
However, while import and export licenses were 
also abolished at that time, substantial "ad valorem" sur-
charges which had a substantially restrictive effect were 
then instituted and have since been maint~ined on the im-
portation of a wide range of merchandise. Retentions on 
the value of a number of export products were also insti-
tuted, but their range has since been considerably reduced 
and, currently, these relate only to a limited number of 
products, mainly agriculture. 
The new system entered operation early in 1959. 
The aims were the relative liberalization of foreign trade, 
the unification of the ·_two exchange rates that formerly 
existed and the establishment of a single free and fluctu-
ating rate. In reality, multiple exchange rates for exports 
and imports continued in operation through the system of 
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retenciones (retention of a specific proportion of foreign 
exchange export earninga) and surcharges. Thus, the actual 
regulations in force are more restrictive than one would 
surmise from reading official statements of policy on for-
eign investment. 
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CHAPTER III 
OPERATING IN AN ll\fFLA.TIONARY ENVIROIDITI~NT 
3.1. Extent and Character of Postwar Inflation 
The economic history of Argentina's first seven 
years under Peron could be SUIIIIUed up in three words:: "Boom 
and Crash." The boom, which lasted only tv10 years, was 
due mainly to two factors for which Peron deserves no credit, 
whereas he unquestionably helped to precipitate the crash. 
The two boom factors were the large wartime gold ~nd for-
eign exchange balance (81,600 million) built up by Argentina 
before Peron came to power, and the premium prices com-
manded by Argentine foodstuffs just after the war because 
of the world-wide food shortage. After these fortuitous 
advantages were exhausted in 1948 the national economy 
slipped inexorably into the deep depression of 1951-1952. 
Argentina, so recently one of the world's greatest exporters 
of beef and wheat, had to ration beef, import wheat and go 
on a black bread diet. Fuel, too, was rationed, so that 
there was a general slow-down of transportation and indus-
try; replacements of machinery for farm and factory became 
unobtainable; even labor in this "workingmen's republic" 
had to go on part time, and persistent inflation wiped ou~ 
successive wage increases decreed by the paternalistic 
government. Table I shows the relation between money wages, 
real wages and the cost of living. 
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Year 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
SOURCE: 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF RE.A.L WAGES IN 
IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, 1953-1959 
(Indices:- 1953 = 100) 
Argentina Brazil 
Wages Cost of Real Wages Cost of Living Wages Living 
114 104 109 . . . . .. 
127 117 109 100 100 
145 132 109 125 122 
191 165 115 152 145 
264 217 122 175 167 
451 464 97 239 228 
Real 
Wages 
. . . 
100 
102 
105 
105 
104 
United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Sta~istics, 
July 1960. 
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When, by 1955, the dictatorship was finally over-
thrown by the Army, Peron's economic policies had left the 
country virtually bankrupt. Desnite the evidence on in-
dustrialization, per capita production had increased only 
3.5% since 1945. Exports were 50% below the levels of 
pre-World 'iiar II years. Hence, the supply of capital goods 
was seriously curtailed. The net go~d and foreign-exchange 
reserves held by the Central Bank, amounting to ?,646 mil-
lion pesos in 1947, dwindled to 1,4e5 million pesos in 
~955. Efforts to distribute income in favor of the urban 
areas and, at ~he same time, an incompatible effort to 
maintain the level of investment led inevitably to wild 
inflation: the supply of money in circulation, which 
totalled 8 billion pesos in 1945, reached 60 billion pesos 
in 1955. 18 By 1957, per capita Gross National Product was 
1.1% lower, per capita gross income 2.7% lower than corres-
ponding 1955 levels. 19 
The situation quickly worsened after Dr. Frondizi 
assumed the Presidency in May 1958. OVerwhelmingly elected 
by a coalition of dissident Radicals, Peronists, and Com-
munists, the new administration was firmly committed to 
18u.s.Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stat-
istics: Foreign Labor Information - Labor in Argentina 
(Washington, D. c., 1959), p. 2. 
l9united Nations, ECLA. -Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 15. 
policies that were in most respects at least as national-
istic as those pursued by Peron. Hov:ever, in December of 
the same year, Frondizi planned some drastic measures to 
save the country from economic ruin. With inflation com-
pletely out of control, he launched an austerity program 
aimed at stabilization and economic development. Credits 
were restricted, government expenditures drastically cut 
and foreign investments encouraged. Massive industrial-
ization, it seemed, was to be the government's remedy for 
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all illnesses which plagued the country since the mid-1940's. 
Any description of the characteristics of the 
inflationary process in Argentina (or Brazil) must take 
' 
into account the peculiarities of supply. There is a 
relative rigidity of domestic supply, deriving mainly from 
the general lack and backwardness of some of the basic 
sectors as well as the meagerness of their capacity to 
1 
import compared to their great needs for food, raw mater-
ials and capital goods. Furthermore, agricultural supply 
has been determined for some years by weather conditions 
rather than by increases in cultivated areas or technolog-
ical improvements, and agricultural supply constitutes a 
large proportion of total supp+y. As a result, the res-
ponse of aggregate supply to chan~es in demand is not as 
flexible in these two countries as it is in the more dev-
eloped ones. Within this relative inelasticity of over-all 
supply, there are also still more pronounced rigidities 
in certain sectors and in the sup9ly of certain specific 
commodities, which make this a structural problem. 
Usually rapid increases in per capita income, 
producing heavier demand for certain goods, come up against 
these rigidities, and the prices of these goods rise. 
Should these price rises tend to be concentrated on raw 
materials and capital goods, they soon spread to the rest 
of the economy through higher costs. If, on the other 
hand, they occur in final consumer goods and services, 
they do not become general. Foodstuffs, hovrever, consti-
tute a special case. In Argentina, food re1)resents apnrox-
ima tely 60;1o of the wage earners' family budget. Any 
increase in food nrices means a nearly comparable rise in 
the cost of living, and this usually prompts demands for 
increases in wa,c:-;es and hence in over-all costs of produc-
tion. If these wage increases do not result - as they 
usually do not - in a permanent re-distribution of income 
in favor of the wage-earning sector, the net effect is 
that prices rise more, proportionately, thB.n the increase 
in labor costs.. In other words, a return to the orig·inal 
distribution of income leads to an increase in profits 
and generates the price-cost spiral. 
Finally, rises in costs can result from exchange 
devaluations as well as from wage increases. :During the 
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late 1950's the internal prices of Argentina's imports 
rose substantially along with a rise in the exchange rate 
of foreign currencies. This upward movement of exchange 
rates a~plicable to exports resulted in a considerable 
rise in the cost of living because sales abroad consist 
almost exclusively of foodstuffs and raw materials which 
enter into the production of articles of common consump-
tion. Invariably, an exchange devaluation causes a rise 
in the internal price of goods which are, in part, exported. 
3.2. Impact of Inflation on Industrial Operations 
The acceleration of welfare legislation and de-
crees dictated by governments since the mid-1940's have 
had a powerful effect upon the cost structure of industry. 
Not only have money wages increased sharply (roughly 2,70CP/o 
between 1943 and 1959), but so have social charges. By 
1959, the numerous contributions to social funds c::~nd direct 
payments t.o his employees for which national legislation 
and contractual arrangements made the tynical industrial 
employer resnonsible amounted to approximately 70% of his 
basic payro11. 2° Furthermore, labor legislation has often 
been administered in snch a way as to make it extremely 
difficult for a company to discharge its employees. Even 
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closing down may not end a company's liability to its workers. 
20u.s. Dept. of Labor: op. ~it., p. 18. 
In many instances, benefit schemes accorded to 
the workers by government have placed an unexpected and 
undue burden upon employers. The most famous example is 
the issue of the aguinaldo (thirteenth-month pay) decree. 
Promulgated on December 20, 1945, at the height of the 
Presidential campaign and obviously designed to win the 
labor vote for Peron, the decree required all commercial 
and industrial establishments to pay the annual bonus as 
of December 31. 21 
Cases like the above inevitably have inflation-
ary consequences. This is important because the disturb-
ing effects of inflation have been the direct cause of 
most industrial conflicts during the last decade. For 
instance, ever since Peron inaugurated such practices, 
governments have considered it advisable to "freeze" wages 
and prices in order to combat inflation. Trade unions 
have vigorously protested against such actions, causing 
the incidence of strikes to increase. 
In the face of industrial strife, the mainten-
ance of order has made it necessary for the government to 
intervene, Such intervention has occasionally resulted 
in the arbitrary regulation of strikes, and more often in 
the arbitrary regulation of strikes, and more often in 
21
see also Blanksten, G., Peron's Ar~entina 
(The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 195 ), p. 263. 
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the grant by decree of emergency wage increases. Frequent 
massive wage increases by themselves foster inflation. 
But the situation has usually been worsened by the provi-
sion that such increases should have "retroactive" effect. 
Since such decrees are usually vaguely worded and leave 
room for different interpretations, no company is sure 
about the exact amount it will have to pay retroactively 
to its workers. Labor costs and social charges are thus 
at best uncertain for some time thereafter, and hedging 
employers tend to impose higher price rises than the in-
crease in costs would warrant. Thus, "creeping" inflation 
is given additional stimulus. The inflationary process 
is further spurred by the fact that most companies must 
have recourse to bank loans to meet retroactive payments; 
interest rates rise and so do costs and prices. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONDITIONS AND POLICIES AFFECTING LABOR SUPPLY 
4.1. Labor and Social Legislation 
Argentina has no single labor code. The nation's 
labor legislation, therefore, is a loose accumulation of 
Constitutional dispositions, legislative decrees, court 
interpretations and collective-bargaining clauses. Basic 
to the matter of labor and social rights is an amendment 
to the 1853 Constitution of the Argentine Republic, ap-
proved by the National Constitutional Convention in October 
1957. A new article was inserted in the Constitution 
stating, among other provisions, that 
Labor in its various forms shall be protected 
by laws guaranteeing every employee decent 
and equitable conditions of employment, fixed 
hours of work, rest periods and leave with 
pay, fair remuneration, an adjustable mini-
mum living wage, equal pay for equal work, 
a share in the profits made by undertakings, 
with a right to participate in management 
and in the org~nization of production, pro-
tection against arbitrary dismissal, stabil-
ity of employment in the public service, and 
the free and democratic orge:miza tion of 
trade unions, which shall be recognized by 
the mere fact of their being enterea in o. 
special register. 
Trade unions shall be guaranteed the right 
to conclude collective labor agreements, 
the right to resort to concilation and ar-
bitration and the right to strike •.• 
The State shall award benefits under the 
social security scheme, which shall be com-
prehensive and obligdtory .... 22 
22International Labor Office: Legislative Series, 
1957, Argentina (Geneva, January-February, 1959). 
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Since 1943 Argentina has to a great extent aban-
doned labor ~egislation by trades, occupation or industry. 
Most of the laws enactea and decrees issued since then 
concern the whole of the labor force. Today, Argentine 
labor legislation provides for: maximum working hours 
(both for day and night work); weekly rest periods, includ-
ing Saturday half -day rest;: paid national holidays and 
other nonworking days, and the amount of pay for any time 
worked during such days; annual paid vacations; protection 
of women and minors; a national minimum wage, an obliga-
tory annual bonus (aguinaldo, discussed previously); family 
allowances, etc. In addition, there are many other bene-
fits such as allowances for married workers and for disabled 
dependent relatives, payments of subsidies for family af-
fairs such as births and weddings, etc. The u. s. Department 
of Labor has analyzed these various legal and contractual 
benefits and concluded that they total about 30% of the 
worker's basic wage. 23 
Practically all native Argentines over eighteen 
years of age (including self-employed workers, employers 
and members of the professions) are covered today by old-
age, disability and survivors-insurance progTams. Commer-
cial and industrial pension funds usually come from 
23u.s. Department of Labor, op.cit., p. 20. 
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contributions of 25% of total wages and salaries -- 10% 
from the employee and 15% from the employer. Pension 
benefits are based upon the wages currently in force and 
not upon those which the pensioner received when in em-
ployment. In other words, pensions are linked with the 
cost of living. Furthermore, pensions are calculated in 
relation to total earnings. The average pensioner receives 
annually about 82% of his or her average earnings for the 
five years (which may not be consecutive) of highest earn-
ings adjusted to current standards. 
Legislation covering industrial accidents, occu-
pational diseases and compensation for them makes every 
employer liable for the accidents sustained b;v his salaried 
or wage-earning employees during their employment or on 
the way to the workplace or the home of the worker, unless 
the accident is intentionally brought about by the injured 
person. Similar dispositions make the employer liable for 
workers' occupational diseases. Employers are reQuired to 
provide medical, surgical, hospital and pharmaceutical ser-
vices. The government provides for maternity benefits 
through the Maternity Fund, to which each female worker 
between the ages of fifteen and forty-five contributes 
the equivalent of one day's pay per quarter. Equal sums 
are paid to the fund by the employer and by the government. 
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4.2. Productivity of the Labor Force 
Argentina is one of the very few countries in 
the world where, despite technological improvements, prod-
uctivity per man was lower in 1955 than it was in 1945. 
During that period, the steady rise in the productivity 
of manufacturing industries was more than neutralized by 
a sharp decline in the productivity of practically all 
other sectors of the economy. This was mainly the conse-
quence of a defective distribution of manpower among the 
various types of employment. The proportion of the econ-
omically active population engaged in agricultural and 
• 
livestock production decreased sharply despite inadequate 
progress in the production techniques of that sector of 
the economy. Furthermore, this process was not accompanied 
by a corresponding and necessary transfer of the migrant 
population to manufacturing industries. Instead, an ex-
ceptionally high proportion of it was diverted to construe-
tion, transportation and service industries. 
Every Argentine employer is aware of the fact 
that skilled workers and technicians have been and still 
are in seriously short supply. Argentine workers insist 
on strict adherence to job classifications; they refuse 
to do work for which they are not specifically hired; they 
staunchly adhere to contract provisions limiting the num-
ber of machines to be operated by a worker; absenteeism, 
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labor turnover, work stoppages and go-slow movements plague 
industry; and large numbers of workers have more than one 
job, with consequent impairment of efficiency in each job. 24 
Furthermore, before the government abolished the practice, 
membership of supervisors in production workers' unions 
made the former unable to fulfill their functions adequate-
ly. Despite factors such as these, however, productivity 
has risen in manufacturing industries through the last 
two decades. This has a threefold explanation. 
First, it 9artly reflects the private entrepren-
eur's unwillingness to employ more workers than barely 
necessary, on three main grounds: high direct and indirect 
labor costs; excessive dismissal payments as provided by 
legislation and collective agreements; and high occurrence 
of labor-management conflicts. Needless to say, up to 
1955, none of these considerations carried much wei:c:,ht in 
determining the employment practices of the state. Second, 
the rate of capital accumulation and mechanization in nan-
ufacturing industries has been, if not adequate, at least 
positive - in contrs.st vli th that of the other sectors of 
the economy (especially transportation and public utilities), 
where the age and poor condition of machinery and equipment 
24u. s. Dept. of Labor: Foreign Labor Inform-
ation - Labor in Argentina (Washington D. c., Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, June 1959), p. 17. 
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is patent. Finally, the rise in productivity must also 
be ascribed to the tmquestionable adaptability of the Ar-
gentine labor force to new industrial jobs. 
4. 3. Attitudes of Management 
Argentine entrenreneu~s have been widely criti-
cized for their tendencies toward cartelization, monopolies, 
nepotism, and, in general, concentration of ownership. 
They have also been critically judged for their unwillin~­
ness to take risks and reinvest earnings "productively," 
and for their prevailing philosophy of hi,c;h profits per 
unit of sale rather than mass markets at low unit profits. 
These criticisms are all valid, well-founded, and obviously 
constructive from an economic-development point of view. 
But such practices have not come about by the joint and 
purposed decision of interested businessmen. ·~hey are the 
automatic response to largely identifiable causes. And 
as long as these causes do not disappear, their effects 
may not be easily corrected. 
The "high profits per unit" philosophy has been 
unquestionably nourished by the protectionist policies fol-
lowed by Argentine governments since the mid-1930's. Pro-
tectionism breeds and vrill continue to breed inefficiency. 
Barred from the influence of foreign competition, Argentine 
industry has been able to pass on to the consu~er the in-
creased costs of governmental labor policies and has 
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adapted itself comfortably to producing largo profits on 
the smallest possible volume. It is no exaggeration to 
state that most Argentine industrialists regard with panic 
the possibility of a relaxation of tariff barriers and 
other protectionist measures. I':Iany industries would soon 
go out of existence if certain foreign goods were allowed 
to be imported. For many industries, the stage of justi-
fied protectionism under the "infant industry" argument 
lies already in the remote :past. The "high profits per 
unit" philosophy is only one of the many :prices Argentine 
industry is paying for an administratively ill-conceived 
industrialization process. We must also keep in mind, how-
ever, that such an approach to profits is partly the con-
sequence of a "trader" business mentality not unrelated to 
cultural characteristics which induce the Argentine to 
maximize his immediate advantage (in this case the business' 
short run profits), while neglecting adequate consideration 
of future goals, and long-run profitability. Furthermore, 
the "mass markets at low unit profits" philosophy is only 
possib+e where a :potential mass market exists. For most 
durables and many consumer products, this is not the case 
in Argentina. Argentines may have been educated to middle-
class appetites, but certainly only a few have middle-class 
incomes. 
Clearly, the possibility of unpredictable and 
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arbitrary government action, always latent in Argentina's 
business world, greatly enhances investment risks. In 
addition, Argentine entrepreneurs are often required to 
make decisions --with regard to production techniques, 
scale of operation, location of factory, means of distri-
bution, and so on -- without any accurate knowledge of 
some of the key variables which will undoubtedly affect 
the result of their investment and with only restricted 
access to suecialized institutions capable of relieving 
the entrepreneur of part of the burden. The incentives 
to save or expand into new fields are few, living as the 
Argentine business does in a world of continuing inflation. 
It is obvious that t.he most practical course for him to 
take to insure himself against losses from monetary deval-
uation is to invest his savings "unproductively" in real 
estate and long-term foreign investments, or to resort to 
immediate luxury consumption. And since the risk of "pro-
ductive" investments is great, interest rates are extremely 
high (reflecting also the pressure of demand for capital 
on available funds). High interest rates are unquestion-
ably a deterrent to investment, especially in industries 
requiring a large initial investment and long years of 
development before profits appear. Thus the vicious circle 
is closed. The latter situation is also attributable to 
the fact that many industrialists have commerce, banking, 
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money-lending, or real estate backgrounds and often tend 
to take a speculative r2.ther than an investment view of 
capital expenditure, laying primary stress on immediate 
returns rather than on the long-term growth of the enter-
prise. 
Argentine entrepreneurs have also been criticized 
for managing their enterprises by following a "rule of 
thumb" method rather than orthodox profit maximization 
stratagies. There is no doubt that Argentine managers are 
far from having adequate knowledge of modern administrative 
tools and methods. Managerial efficiency could indeed be 
greatly increased if serious management-development pro-
grams were undertaken. On the other hand, there are also 
personality factors which help to explain this tendency. 
As a result of their value orientations, entrepreneurs 
tend to subordinate pure business ends and material goals 
to prestige, family, or friendship considerations. Usually 
the profit motive, far from being the sole determining 
factor, is only a guiding element in managerial decisions. 
Very often, "the executive first plans what ought to be 
done and then plans as best he can to make his action pay." 25 
Finally, managerial efficiency is seriously im-
paired by lack of competition in industry. Generally, 
25Whyte, W., and Holmberg, A., Human Problems 
of u.s. Enterprise in Latin America, 1956 (Ithaca, N.Y., 
Cornell University) p. Io. 
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Argentines do not feel the kind of antagonism towards mon-
opolies and cartels conspicuous in u.s. public opinion. 
Their opposition to trusts in general is the consequence 
of, and applies only to, the exploi tc,tion of industry by 
:roreign interests and their power in world markets; only 
rarely does it stem from any profound dedication to a 
competitive private enterprise system. There is therefore 
a high degree of concentration of ownership in privately 
controlled industries. 
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CHAPTER V 
NATURE OF UNITED STATES BUSINESS 1NVEST1~NT 
5 .1. Size 
Since the enactment on December 22, 1958, of the 
foreign Investment Law, No. 14,780, private direct foreign 
investment proposals in lines other than petroleum and 
electric power approved by the Argentine Government totalled 
$387.4 million26 through November 30,1961 (see Table 2). 
Approximately 50% of these proposals were from the United 
States. The principal areas of investment interest were 
industrial chemicals including fertilizers, $118 million; 
motor vehicle construction, $96.7 million; basic nonfer-
rous metal industries, $44.4 million; oil refineries, $28.9 
million; and machinery other than electrical, $26.6 million. 
Since 1946, over $300 million has been added to 
United States direct investments in Argentina, primarily 
out of retained earnings, raising the total to over 8500 
million by the end of 1958. Despite this increase, however, 
Argentina now has a much smaller share of United States 
direct investments than it had before World ''far II •27 In 
fact, ·in 1940 the book value of United States direct 
26u.S.Department of Commerce, Economic Develop-
ments in Ar~entina 1961, Economic Report No. 62-36 {Wash-
ington, D. • ) p. 9. 
27u.s. Department of Commerce, U.S.Investments 
in the Latin American Economy, Office of Business Economics, 
(Washington, D.c.) 1958, p. 57. 
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TABLE 2 
APPROVED FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTT·.I2NTS 
UNDER ARGENTINE LAW 14780, 1958-1961 
(millions of dollars) 
Country 
UNITED STATES 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Western Germany 
Canada 
Italy 
France 
Panama 
Others 
Purpose 
Chemical Products 
Motor Vehicles 
Non-ferrous metals 
Petroleum refining 
Total 
Machinery (excluding electric machinery) 
Sea Transport (other than coastal) 
Others 
Total 
Investment 
$193.21 
49.48 
31.75 
26.25 
25.11 
22.10 
18.15 
11.18 
3.56 
6.60 
$387.40 
Investment 
$118.04 
96.73 
44.37 
28.93 
26.57 
10.25 
62.51 
;)387. 40 
SOURCE: Bank of London & South America, Fortnightly Review, 
30 December 1961. (Quoted in G. Pendle, op.cit:~ 
p. 187). 
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investments was $388 million compared to only $470 million 
in 1956. Foodstuffs -- mainly meat products -- represented 
the bulk of these early investments. It now represents 
a much smaller share of the total. 
As an indication of the present state of events, 
it is-interesting to note that new direct U.S. private in-
vestment in all of Latin America tumbled from a peak of 
$1.2 billion in 1957 (including oil) to $140 million in 
1961. 28 :Most new investment in Argentina today is by com-
panies that are "locked in" by present investments, or 
forced by new government regulations -- restricting certain 
imports, for example -- either to build a plant or get out 
of the market. The automobile companies like Kaiser and 
Willys-Overland are now in this predicament. In 1962, v~en 
the gross national product dropped 10%, some 35 u.s. com-
panies cancelled investment plans. 29 
5.2. The Joint Venture Plan 
Since the end of the Second World War there has 
been a tendency for government policy to favor the joint 
venture approach. (See survey in 6.1.) Actually, the 
growing number of joint ventures reflects a nat~ITal trend. 
28Business Week, September 22, 1962, p. 162. 
29Time, January 25, 1963, p. 82. 
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In earlier days many of such enterprises resulted from the 
association of a foreign supplier with a domestic distri-
butor, the former sup~lying the manufacturing experience 
and the latter the market knowledge. \Vi th the growing 
diversity and extent of industrial activity the domestic 
industrialist looks for solutions to such problems as the 
shortage of exchange, the dearth and high cost of domestic 
capital and the technical and research facilities required 
by modern industry. The foreign supplier receives the 
benefit of knowledge of local markets, established dis-
tributing facilities and the ability to copewith the grow-
ing complexities of government regulations. 
Another important advantage of the joint venture 
is the counterine of one of the most frequently expressed 
criticisms of foreign investment in under-developed cotun-
tries, namely, so-called "unfair" competition with local 
enterprises. It is argued that the greater capital re-
sources usually at the disposal of the foreign firms 
permits them to build more modern plants with lower 1)ro-
- . . 
duction costs, to face initial losses for a longer time 
(presumably deductable from income tax in the country of 
origin) and to pay higher salaries for their personnel. 
While the validity of some of these arguments is at least 
open to question, it is quite true, especially if the dom-
estic partner is a well-knovm. local firm, thst such criticism 
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is rarely levelled at the foreign partner. The joint ven-
ture is usually considered as a domestic enterprise. 
From the foregoing we can deduce that the motives 
for a u.s. company to engage in a joint venture are partly 
of a "business" and partly of a "political 11 nature. The 
principal "business" elements are that partnership reduces 
the capital outlay required in the foreign project, and 
that cooperation with a local industrial group provides 
the investor with the know-how required to operate under 
the specific local conditions. In ideal cases, this may 
enable him to get off to a "flying start," especially vvhen 
the local partners have been engaged in the manufacture 
of similar products, have production facilities and a re-
servoir of managerial and technical personnel, and have 
established distribution channels as well as a certain amount 
of ~ood will and product acceptance. The "nolitical" mo-
tives are based on the assumption that a partnership ar-
rangement with a local industrial gro1:tp or local individual 
shareholders may offer some protection a~dinst nationalist 
pressures of one or another variety. 
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The early foreign investors in ArgentEJ,. were gen- -.. ·---
erally the very large companies with extensive funds avail-
able for foreign investment and vTith elaborate denartments 
for foreign operations in their home offices. The fact 
of their early presence in Argentina, moreovGr, demonstrates 
that they have historically been inclined toward foreign 
investment and have a tradition of coiillJitting funds and 
executive manpo~Ner overse:_-~s. The more recent arrivals, 
on the other hand, are often smaller in the United States, 
and have had much less experience in international oper-
ations. This tends to encourage reliance on the assistance, 
financial and managerial, of local partners. These post-
war investors entered the scene in a period of rapid 
industrialization, often under time pressure, and were 
generally forced to establish immediately productive fac-
ilities on a substantial scale, Hithout being able to 
train manpower gradually and to accumu+ate financial re-
serves through initial assembly and partial manufacturing 
operations. Their need for obtaining local capital and 
local know-how and physical facilities through partnership 
arrangements was consequently more acute. 
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PART III 
BRAZIL 
CHAPTER I 
R'\.CKGROUND 
1.1. Pre-War_ P~~!tion of Industry 
The Great Depression, followed by World War II 
and by a sustained period of deliberate promotion of manu-
facturing after the war, appears to mark an important and 
lasting shift of direction in Brazil's economic development. 
, 
The economic crisis contributed to industrialization in 
several ways. Coffee growers shifted their available in-
vestment funds to industry. Far-reachine foreign exchange 
depreciation provided, for a time, unusually effective 
protection a~dinst import competition, and existing sur-
plus industrial capacity was brought back into production. 
The political orientation of the dictatorial regime under 
Getulio Vargas (1930-1945) tended to favor budding indus-
trialists and their interests as contrasted with those of 
the old land-holding aristocracy. These trends were fur-
ther enhanced by the war, which drastically curtailed 
imports and led to every type of substitute domestic pro-
duction for which capital goods could somehow be made or 
secured. Iron foundries, cement plants and the rudiments 
of a steel industry were opening the phase of domestic 
production of capital goods. In the textile field, by now 
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a very substantial manufacturing industry, there was a boom 
of unprecedented proportions, Brazil becoming at the end 
of the war one of the world's major exporters. 
During the fifteen years since V/orld i.7ar II, 
Brazil has experienced almost continuous general economic 
growth, with development on the industrial side far out-
pacing that in agriculture of services. A conservative 
estimate, discounting certain upward biases in the gener-
ally quoted semiofficial national accounts figures, places 
the over-all growth in real output since 1947 at 5 to 6% 
per year (on a per capita basis, 2.5 to 3.5%) and the in-
crease in industrial output at 8 to 10% per year.3° 
Despite a number of critical imbalances severe 
monetary inflation, bottlenecks in transportation and power 
supply, a general lag in agriculture and in exports other 
than coffee, and the total failure of the vast northeast-
ern region to participate in the over-all national growth 
- the dominant movement has been a process of sustained 
and cumulative develonment. Especially in the south, in 
the "industrial triangle" of San Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and 
Belo Horizonte, a sufficiently diversified industrial 
structure has developed to provide many of the external 
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economies which in turn attract further industrial investment. 
3°L. Gordon and E. Grommers, United States Manu-
facturinr Investment in Brazil, (Div. of Research; Graduate 
School o Business Administration, Harvard, 1962) p. 4. 
In that region, although not yet in the country as a vrhole, 
the process of economic development has tdken on many of 
the characteristics of what Rostow calls "self-sustaining 
economic growth. 11 
In this connection, it is interesting to note 
that the State of Sao Paulo and the old Federal District 
(now the state of Guanabdra) together, which in 1957 con-
tained 23% of the population and 4% of the total national 
income and 80% of the nonagricultural income. The income 
per capita in these two states amounted to $520, precisely 
double the national average. 
This transformation obviously involved far-reach-
ing social as well as economic changes. It required a 
su~ply of entrepreneurs on a scale hitherto unknown in 
Brazil. They came partly from self -made nevv immigrant fam-
ilies, especially Italian, German and near-Eastern, and 
partly from foreign colli~tries. In the early stages, most 
of the domestic business concerns were family affairs, often 
combining interests in agriculture, trade, real estate and 
construction, banking and manufacturing industry; by the 
late 1950's, however, a perceptible trend was in motion 
toward the depersonalization and professionalization of a 
few of these enterprises. The process also helped to create 
a new type of middle class (see below), ranging from skilled 
workers to middle level mana&ers, and supplementing the 
traditional Brazilian middle class of civil servants, 
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military officers, teachers and professionals. 
Governmental policies played a part in this dev-
elopment in many ways. They included the stimulation of 
import substitution through tariff and exchange protection, 
the financing of electric power development and road and 
railway construction, and the direct operation of certain 
enterprises, especially in iron and steel and petroleum 
exploration and refining. Certain governmental policies 
had a retarding effect, notably the close limitations on 
public utility rates in a period of severe inflation. The 
character and impact of the policies affecting U.S. inves-
tors will be described in subsequent chapters. 
1.2. Influence of the Middle Sectors 
One of the striking political developments of 
post-World War II Latin America has been the urban middle 
sectors' tardy attainment of an influential position on 
the national level in Brazil. Equally striking is the fact 
that because the military has reserved the right to inter-
fere in civilian affairs they have not been free agents~ 
Even when the military has remained in the background, the 
middle sectors have not been sufficiently united to carry 
out programs without strong outside support. Middle sector 
leadership, consequently, has been forced on the one hand, 
to think as the military and, on the other, to make political 
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bargains. As a result, its conduct to date cannot be as-
sumed to indicate the course it would pursue under more 
favorable political circumstances. 
Up to 1920 the middle sectors had not given evi-
dence of leadership qualities. They had produced nothing 
resembling the urban-oriented and politically aggressive 
Radical Civic Union in Argentina, which, among other things, 
had served to integrate an important part of the immigrant 
population of the cities into the political life of the 
Argentine nation. Brazil's sizable immigrant population 
was largely ineffective politically. Because of the wide-
spread inertia that characterized the Brazilian middle 
elements, the narrowly circumscribed ruling elite of the 
republic had not felt itself under any serious compulsion 
to share political power with them. 
I During the decade of the 1920 s Brazil fell still 
further behind Argentina in most of those spheres of growth 
that ease the way for the middle sectors politically • 
. Commerce and industry suffered from the general lack of 
imagination displayed by the moulders of opinion and policy. 
Domestic capital was not discouraged from indulgin0 its 
preference for exploitative agriculture, speculative in-
vestment in real estate and those industrial ventures that 
promised high-unit profits and short-term gains. The tax 
provisions under the Constitution whereby the income of 
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the states came largely from export taxes while the federal 
income came primarily from import taxes served to protect 
the existing agricultural export economy and to hinder the 
rise of the manufacturing industries. The limited encour-
agement that manufacturing received from protective tariffs 
was counterbalanced by what must be termed official dis-
regard for all forms of transportation and power development. 
The official disregard for industry, transport-
ation and power was reflected in the continued pronounced 
rural nature of the population. An urban movement was under 
way in 1930 but not on the scale of that in Argentina. 
Brazil was still a highly rural country vd th an estimated 
80% of its population living outside the urbo.n centers. 
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo contained only 7% of the total 
pormla tion - and these were the two principal cities. 
Also, there had been no serious attempt to incorporate the 
newcomers into the body politic. The lack of imagination 
displayed in economics and politics was manifest in the 
labor field where the oligarchical leadership refused to 
extend to the emerging vvorking elements m2.ny of the rights 
and privile~es those groups won during the 1920's in 
neighboring cotmtries. 
The 1920's, nonetheless, become important in any 
political and economic diagnosis of the mid6_le sectors. 
During that decade it became progressively apparent that 
educational, technological and political retardation were 
78 
symptoms rather than causes of the bacbvard development 
in which the republic found itself. There were more basic 
considerations. The nation was sufferin~ from the divi-
sive forces of regionalism. No less costly was the fact 
that Brazil, like Argentina, was shackled economically to 
a,cvicul tural commodities produced in limited areas by a 
relatively few individuals. As in Argentina, the producers 
of those commodities could insist upon a disproportionate 
share in the political life of the republic becatlSe there 
was no other economic element capable of challenging them. 
Finally, the Brazilian military persistently had renained 
above or just below the murky political waters of the re-
public. Many younger officers, in revolt against the 
established order, became the precursors of a social change 
favorable to the civilian middle groups. 
When the Constitution of 1891 broke down tmder 
the stresses aggravated by world-wide depression, the mili-
tary, as the moderator of civilian disputes, removed 
Washington Luiz from the presidency in November 1930 and 
cleared the way for Getulio Vare;as' assumption of power. 
It thereby unintentionally had a direct hand in setting 
the stage for Brazil's entering a new era, ~uring which 
over-all national policy smoothed the way for the urban 
middle sectors' successful bid for greater :omver immediately 
following World War II. 
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Nearly all the major decisions made by Vargas 
directly affected the urban middle sectors, man~r adversely. 
However, the advantages probably outw·eighed the disadvan-
tages. The dictator was an advocate of public education 
in the best middle sector tradition, although it often had 
to compete with other activities for his attention and for 
public funds. Nevertheless, the urban middle sectors ben-
efited greatly. The products of the schools, whether 
urban or rural in background, ordinarily found employment 
in the larger populated centers. They became the customers 
of merchants who often belonged to the middle groups or 
who were on their way to becoming middle sector. In the 
industrial and commercial cities --where the emerging 
elements first successfully challanged the elite groups 
the newly educated felt most directly the political infl1l-
ence of the middle segments. 
By 1940 Vargas• efforts on behalf of commerce 
and manufacturing had won widespread support. Commerce 
and industry were, relB.tive to agriculture, offering high-
level employment to almost 20% of the total labor force 
engaged in nondomestic pursuits. 31 The federal governments 
11 obligation" to protect domestic industry had won wide 
31 
L. Gordon and E. Grommers, op. cit., p. 165. 
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acceptance by the majority elements within the politically 
articulate civilian groups. Vargas had sold labor --
which was becoming more politically conscious -- on the 
advantages of cooperating with capital and on the need to 
sacrifice in the interest of the futv~e welfare of society.* 
Encouraged by the favorable factors mentioned 
above and further stimulated by a rising demand for con-
sumer goods following the disruption of international trade 
that accompanied the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, 
Brazilian industry expanded steadily throu~pout the war 
years. By 1946 industry and commerce had arrived econom-
ically as the value of manufacturing approached t!1e value 
of agricultural and livestock production. Industry had 
grown to a stage where its future was assured. The owners 
of industry and commerce had become politically powerful 
in their own right. However, the fact still remains that 
the urban middle sectors have been restrained by severe 
political handicaps. The military has served as a definite 
deterrent to responsible civilian government and, in those 
areas of development that positively affect the political 
role of the middle sectors, the gains have been relative. 
National nolitical narties have increased in strength but 
* It is interesting to note that after his ouster 
in 1945 Vargas developed a new philosophy which, in es-
sence, held that labor had been ill-treated by the employer 
elements and that it must assert itself. 
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party politics remains on an immature level. The republic 
has become more urbanized but it remains more rural than 
Argentina. Brazil's population is becoming more literate, 
but it is still true that every other Brazilian is still 
an illiterate -- not a favorable condition for the growth 
of representative government, which the middle sectors ad-
vocate. Industry has grown appreciably, as have commerce 
and the services, but the politically active labor force 
is still so small and fragmented that the formation of a 
middle sector-working element political amalgam has not 
been attractive to the middle sector leadership. For the 
future it appears that middle sector influence will be 
exercised primarily in conjunction with the more conserva-
tive elite elements. How this has and will affect United 
States private investment decisions will be considered in 
the chapters following. 
1.3. Position of United States Investment 
The most dynamic area of U.S. investment in Brazil 
during the period since World War II has been in manufact-
uring for the local market. This is clearly shown by the 
data in Table 3, which also indicates the scale of u.s. 
direct investments in Brazil in relation to the total in 
Latin America. Electric power supply is, of course, vital 
to development, but as a highly regulated industry it is 
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TABLE 3 
UNITED STATES TOTAL DIRECT INVESTI:1:ENT AND DIRECT 
IVTANUFACTURING INVESTMENT* IN BRAZIL, 
SELECTED YEARS 1929-1960 
End of 
year 
192q 
"1946 
1950 
1959 
1960 
Value of u.s. Direct 
Investments in Brazil 
(millions of dollars) 
Proportion of u.s. 
Direct Investments 
in Brazil to Total 
in Latin America 
(per cent) 
All Manuf'ac-
Pro~ortion 
of anufac- All :Manufac-
Fields turing turing to Fields turing Total 
$194 $ 46 24% 6% 20% 
323 126 39 11 32 
644 285 44 14 36 
839 438 52 10 31 
953 515 54 11 32 
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business, Office of Business 
E""conomics·, TJ. S. Department" of Commerce. 
* In 1961, the amount of u.s. investor participation by 
industry as a percentage of the total foreign capital 
investment in Brazil is as follows: 
Basic Industr;y: 
Steel 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 
Heavy and electric machinery 
Autos and parts 
Mining 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 
Parts, accessories, tractors, 
Light Industr;y: 
Textiles 
Foods 
Light chemicals and industrial 
pharmacetlticals 
Light machinery 
Vegetable oils 
Others 
l. 5% 
1.6 
5.0 
54.0 
1.0 
4.5 
implements 4.0 
71.6% 
6.0 
9.0 
1.5 
6.5 
28.4% 
SOURCE: Derived from data in Brazilian Business, 
April, 1962 
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involved in very specialized relationships with govermn.ent 
that are entirely different from those experienced by man-
ufacturing industry. Banking and air transportation are 
similarly fields with special characteristics. 
In the field of mining, U. s. enterprise has 
played a relatively small part in Brazil. Petroleum pro-
duction is reserved as a state monopoly by Brazilian law. 
Efforts at u.s. iron mining have only just begun as has 
the attempt at manganese mining in the far north. In any 
event, the main inducement to investment in extractive 
industry for foreign markets is the presence and accessi-
bility of high-grade ores. While governmental policy toward 
the exploitation of such minerals has a major bearing on 
economic development, including opportunities for earning 
foreign exchange and augmentation of governmental resources 
through profit sharing or taxation, the role of these in-
dustries in the developmental process is less direct than 
that of manufacturing industry for domestic consumption. 
Thus, as noted in the introduction, major emphasis in this 
paper is upon investments in manufactvring industry, with 
occasional references to retail distribution. 
During the post World War II period the Brazilian 
government was promoting a major effort at industrialization. 
A number of governmental incentives were introduced, espec-
ially in the field of foreign exchange, and particular 
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attention was given to attracting foreign capital and 
technical skills. As Table 3 makes clear, this has also 
been the neriod of the main flow of u.s. direct manufac-
turing investments to Brazil. In a survey of thirty-six 
manufacturing companies with operations in Brazil, some 
70 per cent had had no manufacturing experience there 
before the war.3 2 And as to the remaining 30%, their main 
phase of expansion in all cases occurred during this post-
war period. 
Some impression of the proportion of total u.s. 
manufacttrring investment in Brazil can be derived from 
data on the import licenses for manufacturing equipment 
granted by the Brazilian government under SUMOC Instruction 
113, a special measure adopted in 1955 favoring direct in-
vestment by foreign companies in the form of machinery 
and equipment. (See section 2.4. for a fuller discussion 
of this measur~) Not all foreign investment came in under 
this provision, but it almost certainly covered the great 
bulk of such investments after 1955. It will be seen from 
'rable 4 that the licenses issued to participating companies 
amounted to over two-thirds of all licenses issued to u.s. 
companies and almost one-third of licenses issued to all 
foreign investors. 
32L. Gordon and E. Grommers, op.cit., p. 9. 
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It is interesting to note also that partici~ating 
companies in the automotive industry account for one-half 
of all licenses to u.s. investors surveyed in the study 
mentioned above. The automotive assembly and components 
industry has experienced an especially dramatic development 
in Brazil in recent years (as described in section 3.1.), 
and it has involved foreign investment in large magnitudes. 
Soon after the inauguration of President Janie 
Quadros in January 1961, major changes were made in cer-
tain aspects of Brazilian policy affecting forei.gn invest-
ment. Of particular importance were the exchane;e control 
decrees ( Sill\WC Instructions 204-208) elimin8.ting the mul-
tiple foreign exchan.ge rate system and the exchanP;e auctions 
(except for minor imports classified in the 11 Special cate-
gory"). Effects of these changes on the :Srazilian invest-
ment climate will be noted in the several chapters helow. 
1.4. Economic Nationalism 
Economic nationalism in Brazil probably received 
its first sharp impulse under Vargas. He was responsible 
for a wide range of nationalistically inspired measures 
that were taken in the economic field to supplant those 
designed specifically to promote domestic industry. Severe 
restrictions were placed upon foreigners and foreign-dom-
iciled companies in the exploitation of minerals, petroleum 
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TABLE 4 
LICENSES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS UNDER 
SUMOC INS~RUCTION 113, 1955-1960 
(thousands of dollars) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Total licenses 
to all foreicn 42,027 47,452 119,157 104,176 86,817 107,219 
investors 
LICENSES TO ALL 16,061 20,070 64,137 58,858 26,224 39,109 
U.S. INVESTMENT 
Licenses to par- 1,777 10,105 45,621 47,793 23,069 25,760 
ticipating com-
panies 
T.otal licenses 17,000 13,800 56,300 76,700 54,382 60,487 
to automotive 
industry (all 
countries) 
Licenses to par- 3,255 31,836 38,294 21,070 20,620 
ticipating com-
panies in auto-
motive field 
Net u.s. invest- 7,000 23,000 33,000 58,000 35,000 52,00Q 
ments in aanu-
facturing in 
Brazil 
SOURCES: Figu.r••.relating to Instruction lil3 licenses compilled from 
Mon~·~J'lletins of tbe Brazilian Superintendency of Money 
anCI·cre . t (SUMOC). 
Net manufacturing inveat .. nts provided by Bureau of Foreign 
Business, u.s. Department of Coaaerce. 
87i 
Total 
506,848 
224,459 
154,125 
278,669 
115,075 
208,000 
- including refining and distribution - Gncl the develop-
ment of water power. "Progressive nationalization" in key 
economic areas was written into the Constitution of 1934. 
Fiscal revenues were used for social welfare and public 
improvements rather than for resuming payments on public 
debts defaulted before and during the depression. Special 
taxes were levied on foreign companies domiciled abroad 
and on exch<=:nge remittances. Vargas began buyin,rs up the 
foreign companies that controlled the Brazilian railroads, 
and 1vi thin a few years the bulk of the present federal 
railroad net was brought under the central government's 
control. Beginning in 1942 the dictator save a strone im-
petus to domestic aviation. Volta Redonda, the lar:::r,est 
iron and steel plant in Latin America, is to civilian and 
military groups alike the symbol and proof of Brazil's 
industrial emanci~ation. 
To add to the confusion created by rampant nation-
alism and by a politically conscious military, there has 
been the nressure put upon political stability by a s~i­
raling inflation, which was rooted in the Var~3"as era. ':Che 
economic and social problems Brazil inherited from the 
dictator were highly complex and thus far have basically 
defied solution. An urban population increasinp;ly dissat-
isfied with its level of living and clamorin~ for relief 
from the uncertainties of urban existence has placed heavy 
88 
demands on leaders vrho in general have lacked firmness. 
By 1950 the republic found itself confronted with runaway 
prices brought on in considerable part by the politicians' 
attempts in some way to balance the demands of both the 
industrial and the working elements while they kept the 
producers of export commodities satisfied. From the ec-
onomic disorder and inflation of the 1940's Brazil passed 
to near economic chaos and more inflation in the 1950's. 
Proceeding at a dangerous pace, inflation has in recent 
years colored the moves of all political forces. These 
forces -- both political and economic have had diverse 
effects on U.S. private investment in Brazil. Je will 
consider some specifics below. 
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CHAPTER II 
2.1. Outline of Postwar Foreign -~J{_Ch?-ng~_a..nd Tariff 
Policies 
Within the range of possible government incentives 
to industrial development, domestic or foreign, open to a 
developing country, Brazil has concentrated on the mani-
pulation of foreign exchange rate privileges, tariff and 
quota protection and selective exemption from import duties. 
Differential tax treatment and outright subsidy have played 
a minor role, although government financing has been im-
portant for investments in economic infrastructure -- power 
supply, transportation and communication -- and in a few 
basic industries. 
For a short period immediately after the war and 
extending to mid-1947, foreign exchange reserves were abttn-
dant because of the large demand for Brazil's exports and 
the decrease of imports during the war years. There were 
no quantitative restrictions on imports and foreign ex-
change was freely available for capital transactions. The 
customs tariff retained its prewar protective features, 
but since it consisted of specific duties, and price levels 
had greatly increased, its actual protective effect had 
been greatly reduced. 
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During this period the cruzeiro was kept at its 
prewar value, a figure seriously out of line with relative 
price levels because of the heavy wartime inflation in 
internal Brazilian nrices and costs. This unrealistic 
exchange rate intensified the demand for imports and also 
discouraged exports once the immediate postwar sellers' 
market passed away. As a result, Brazil's foreign exchanGe 
reserves rapidly melted avvay, a large fraction of them 
being dissipated for consumer goods rather than for im-
ports of capital equipment that were badly needed to counter 
wartime obsolescence and to facilitate further industrial 
expansion. 
By the middle of 1947 Brazil had entered the 
phase of chronic foreign exchange crisis which, with the 
exception of a few good coffee years, has lasted to the 
present time. Until the beginning of 1953 the cruzeiro/ 
dollar exchange rate was still maintained at the unreal-
istic figure of 18.5, a grossly overvalued rate that dis-
couraged exports and created a massive demand for imuorts. 
Imuorts were further stimulated by the fear that the Korean 
War might lead to another period of severe shortage in 
goods for importation, or in shipping, such as had occurred 
during both World Wars. The demand was held in check 
through a drastic system of licensing. At the same time, 
annual capital repatriation was limited to 20% and transfer 
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of earnings to 8% of registered capital.33 The customs 
tariff was further losing its importance as a means of 
import control, as continuing increases in nrices under-
mined the system of specific duties. In the circumstances, 
the licensed imports were in effect being highly subsid-
ized by virtue of the unrealistic exchange rate. 
~rhe licensing system, opera ted by the Export-
Import Department of the Bank of Brazil (CEXIM), was based 
on a scale of priorities. A number of highly essential 
goods, such as drugs, insecticides and fertilizers could 
be imported freely. Others, such as fuels, foodstuffs of 
prime necessity, cement, paper and printing equipment, and 
machinery for the exp+oitation of natural resources, re-
ceived priority in licensing. In the next category came 
machinery and equipment for the inst~llation, extension 
and modernization of industries, with preference for in-
dustries manuf~cturing productive equipment or essential 
consumer goods, especially if national raw materials were 
to be utilized. Nonessential goods were prohibited or 
closely restricted. So also, under the law of similars 
(see section 2.3.), were imports of essential goods that 
were being produced within the country under satisfactory 
conditions of quality and price. 
33Brazilian Embassy, Surve~ of the Brazilian 
Economy, (Washington D.C.) 1960, p.9. 
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As the pressure of excess demand for foreign ex-
change became increasingly felt, long delays and great 
irregularity were encountered in the operation of the 
licensing system. In view of the large vrindfall urofi ts 
available to the importers who received licenses, it is 
hardly surprising that there were increasing alle:gations 
of corruption in the system's administration. Alterna-
tively, the svstem was simply bypassed by smuggling. 
~:~any importers found relief in the "compensation 
deals" under which Brazilian exporters of hard-to-sell 
products were allowed to seel their foreir;:,n exchanP:e to 
importers at a uremium. This system amotUlted to a kind 
of ad hoc devaluation of the cruzeiro, and it reached large 
proportions in the last years of the licensing period. 
There was also a brief effort by the authorities to relieve 
the foreign exchange shortage by transferring minor exports 
and luxvxy imports to a free exchange market established 
for certain transactions early in 1953. 
In mid 1953 the situation was ch.B,nged radically 
by the abolition of licensing and the introduction of a 
system of multiple rates of exchange, operated through a 
complex mechanism of weekly auctions of foreign currency. 
This ~rovided a de facto devaluation of the cruzeiro for 
for imports and established a market mechanism for equating 
foreign exchange supply and demand. Moreover, it siphoned 
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off to the government the windfall profits from imnorts 
and eliminated the pressures for administrative corruption 
in the issuance of licenses. 
Restrictions on capital transfers and remittance 
of profits were abolished in 1953 and a free exchange mar-
ket was allowed for these transactions, along with invisible 
services. Special preferential rates were made available 
for certain indispensable commodities such as petroleum, 
wheat, fertilizers and newsprint. A preferential rate 
could also be obtained to finance imports of equipment 
registered with the Superintendency of Money and Credit 
(SUMOC) as being of "special interest to the national econ-
omy," through loans of at least five-year maturity and, 
until 1955, for repatriation of earnings on equity capital 
similarly registered. It is significant that during most 
of the period in which the foreign exchange auction system 
was in force, about one-half of the total imnorts were 
brought in under preferential rates or other special ar-
rangements outside the auction system. 
Finally, in the spring of 1961, as its first major 
step in economic policy, the Quadros Administration abol-
ished the auction system for all imports in the general 
category, shifting them to the free exchange market. Auc-
tions were retained for the special category. At the time 
the rate for preferential imports was greatly increased 
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and soon aftervvard these items were also transferred to 
the free market. The net effect of this major reform was 
a close approximation to a unified foreign exchange rate 
system. 
2.2. Import Controls 
During the licensing period the low import nri-
ority given to many consumer goods, resulting often in 
complete blockage of imports, constituted a distinct in-
centive to local manufacturing of items previously imported. 
An interesting example is provided by one of the companies 
that participater'l. in a study conducted by the Harvard Cen-
ter for International Affairs. 34 This general merchand-
ising company had started builjing a chain of department 
stores in Brazil in 1947, during the period of exchange 
abundance, with the purpose of opening up new markets for 
U.S. products. Soon after operations began, the exch-::mge 
difficulties started, imports were increasingly restricted 
and it became clear that the company would have to find 
local sources of supply to protect its investment. 
Since local sources were non-existent, the company 
decided to take an active part in developing them, acting 
as an intermediary betv,reen its sup:oliers in the United States 
and potential Brazilian suppliers. In some cases it promoted 
34L. Gordon and E. Grommers, op.cit. 
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joint ventures or technical assists.nce agreements, and in 
others it was able to persuade u.s. suppliers to open 
their factories to visiting Brazilians and to supply tech-
nical advice without charge. Occasionally local suppliers 
were also assisted financially. Since its establishment 
in Bra.zil, the company has thus promoted the local manu-
facture of such varied items as floor waxes, vacuu~ clean-
ers, small electric motors, waffle irons, aluminu~ cookware, 
blu.e jeans, drapery rna terial and other consumer ,n:oods. 
The incentive features of the licensing system 
were limited in the case of assemblers and manufacturers 
who had to rely on imports of components and ravr materials, 
even though the latter theoretically had priority over fin-
ished goods. Long delays and uncertainty in the issuance 
of licenses were seriously dai!lB.g-ing to operational effi-
ciency. An almost inherent complication of any import 
licensin5 system -- namely, allocation on the basis of 
historical data - caused problems for exuanding enter-
prises. che allegations of corruption in the issuing agency 
caused further difficulties. These factors tended to coun-
teract the elements of the licensing system which stimu-
lated local assembly or manufactv.re. It is tr1.1e that when 
a relatively large proportion of local raw materials could 
be used, the above disadvantases became less si,s:nificant. 
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J\..S previously noted, the :Brazilian :::>;overnment 
has sought to promote industrialization by several types 
of preferential import treatment for manufactu.ring equip-
ment. These incentives have taken form of tariff reduc-
tions and exemptions, :9riority in the issuance of imnort 
licenses and advantageous exchange rates. The impact of 
Instruction 113, the most important of these meas1ITes, is 
discussed below. However, some of the comnanies in the 
study previously alluded to have been affected by other 
measures in this area as well. 
For example, a company that began manufacturing 
automotive parts for the replacement market in 1951 re-
ported that it had no difficulty in obtainins licenses for 
importing machinery and vvas in addition granted consider-
able reductions and exemptions from imnort duties. It 
should be noted, however, that the decision to r;o into 
Brazil would probably have been made without the favorable 
tariff treatment. :rhe company foresaw a rapidly expanding 
market for its product in Brazil, in which it wanted to 
particinate. Because of the existence of a local industry, 
protected by the law of simil9-rs, imuorting was imnossible 
and so there was no option but to undertake manufacturing. 
In the early 1950's the specific tariff duties 
had become quite low in relation to the price of imnorted 
goods. With the introduction of the new tariff law in 1957, 
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exemptions and reductions became more important. 'I'he new 
ad valorem duties on machinery range generally between 
20 and 100%, with most items falling between 35 and 60%. 
Reductions of up to half the duty can be granted by the 
Custome Policy Council on imported machinery ~rovided no 
national equivalent has been registered as a similar. In 
addition, full exemptions have frequently been awarded by 
special law. Savings on imported machinery of 30 to 60%, 
and even more, have been realized by some of the comDanies 
in the Harvard study. 
2.3. The Law of Similars 
During the 1890's the policy of tariff protection 
a:,rp.inst the importation of items loc':,lly produced in suf-
ficient quality and quantity became generalized and commonly 
referred to as the "law of si:::d.lars." This policy led in 
1911 to the institution of a "Register of Similar Products," 
administered by a commission to whom local uroducers de-
siring protection could apply for registration. f~d.minis­
trative tariff exemptions or reductions were forbidden 
with respect to items thus registered. In recent years 
registration of a product as a "similar" has become the 
basis, in practice if not always as a matter of law, for 
broad tariff protection and also for cle.ssification in a 
high foreign exchange rate category under the multiple 
rate system. The term "law of similars" is now widely 
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used to refer to all types of protective measures based 
on the existence of locally produced similar products. 
The precise meaning of "sufficient quality and quantity" 
of production nequired to justify registration as a sim-
ilar has always been left flexible, and subject to a great 
deal of administrative discretion. 
The experience of the companies participating 
in the Harvard study indicates that the operation of the 
law of similars hGs been a most pm:verful incentive for 
foreign investors to move from importing into assembly, 
or from·assembly into fullfledged manufacturing. The es-
sential feature of this incentive has been fear of out-
right exclusion from the market rather than hope for 
preferential treatment in relation to competitors. In 
many cases, the mere report that some Brazilian or com-
peting foreign firm was contemplating manufacture, with 
the implication that imports of similar goods would hence-
forth be ruled out, was the critical factor impelling U.S. 
companies to move to preserve their market position by 
building local plants. Sometimes even the fear of such 
a move, Without any specific report, sufficed to bring 
about a positive investment decision. 
The effect of the law of similars, which could 
be termed the "anticipatory effect," is illustrated by the 
following typical case. During the period of import li-
censing, one of the companies participating in the study 
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was engaged in importing raw materials for use by plastic 
molders when it became known that one of its largest Braz-
ilian customers was planning to undertake the manufacture 
of these raw materials locally. Foreseeing the serious 
reductions in licenses that would result from the materis.l-
ization of these plans, the u.s. company decided to go 
ahead and construct its ovrn local manufacturing facilities. 
It was supported in this direction by other Brazilian 
molders, who were afraid of becominrr, dependent on a mono-
poly supplier that would at the same time be a comnetitor 
in the sale of the end product. 
In another example, a chemical company renorted 
having built a plant "to forestall a threat by Gerl"'.ans to 
build a similar plant." A further examnle c,c::~n be found 
in the manufacture of durable consumer goods such as 
household appliances, radio and television sets, and 
record players, where anticipated moves of competitors 
accelerated the initiation of assembly operations and the 
manufactu..re of certain components. 
This antici~)atory effect, of course, operates 
mainly with comnanies that have been previously enga~ed 
in importin:g or assembly. Most companies that skin the 
importing stage do so because a local industry is already 
established and protected by the law of similars. A tire 
ms<nufacturer, for example, was attracted by the increase 
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in demand for tires and tubes in the postwar neriod and 
the prospects of even more rapid growth in this market. 
Several of its large international competitors already 
operated plants in Brazli and importation was practically 
impossible. The only way to get a share of this market, 
consequently, was to build a competing factory. 
From the information gained in the Harvard study 
it is evident that the more a company has invested in its 
physical importing and distribution apparatus, and in in-
tangible assets such as good will, product acceptance and 
knowledge of the market, the more determined it is to pro-
teet its position by initiating an assembly operation. 
Once this has been done, it becomes even more difficult 
to abandon the investment when confronted vvi th the choice 
betwesn makin~ the final step into manufacturing or being 
squeezed out of the market. 
This experience is in line with recent observa-
tions that investment decisions are often motivated as 
much by the objective of maintaining market shares and 
trading positions as by close calculations of profit max-
imization.35 This type of policy encourages the move in 
forei@l operations from distribu.tion tmvard assembly, or 
35see John R. Meyer and Edwin Kuh, ~he Invest-
ment Decision, (Harvard University Press, 1957) p. 20. 
101 
assembly toward manufacturing, notwi thstancl_ino; the nossi-
bility of considerable short-run losses and. the fact that 
future profitability cannot alvmys be established with 
certainty. 
With a market as large as Brazil's, and a gen-
eral climate of economic expansion, the impact of the law 
of similars cannot readily be disentangled from r;eneral 
business considerations favoring additional foreign invest-
ment. A number of the companies participating in the study 
referred' to previously had been considering the possibil-
ity of moving into local manufacturing and indicated that 
they would at some time in the future have made this shift 
even without the anticipated exclusion of their imports. 
In these cases, the law of similars served more to accel-
erate an investment decision than to cause one that would 
not otherwise have taken place. In other cases, however, 
managements were distinctly hesitant to go into foreign 
manufacturing, and without the "shock treatment" of the 
law of similars might have nut off the action even beyond 
the time that local production would have been warranted 
by normal economic or business factors. 
There remains a significant class of cases, how-
ever, where technical considerations and the small scale 
of the market make production in Brazil far more cost~y 
than imports for an indefinite period. In these instances, 
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investments in local production must be attributed solely 
to the law of similars, and some of them may well repre-
sent dubious undertakings from the viewpoint of the Braz-
ilian economy. 
2.4. The Effects of Instruction 113 
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Early in 1955 a measure was introduced that enabled 
foreign investors, under certain conditions, to import 
equipment without exchange cover. This important innova-
tion was embodied in SUMOC Instruction 113, and hc:~s been 
known under that name ever since, even after its incorpor-
ation into the Tariff law of 1957. Under Instruction 113 
a foreign investor was permitted to import machinery if 
his supnliers agreed to accept payment, not in the form 
of cash or deferred debt, but by assuming instead a cruz-
eiro capital uarticipation in the enterprise in which the 
equipment was to be used. CACEX (the Foreign Trade Depart-
ment of the Bank of Brazil), which replaced CEX:IM and is 
responsible for the administration of Instruction 113, was 
to give approval only if the investment was desirable for 
the economy of the country. This criterion was met auto-
matically if the equipment was to produce goods classified 
in certain categories of the import control system. For 
lower categories, where in fact most goods fell, CACEX was 
to consult the Council of STJlviOC, and various interested 
agencies and outside bodies, generally including the 
National Confederation of Industries, were heard before 
approval was granted. 
Approval was normally to be given only for com-
plete sets of manufacturing equipment, although in excep-
tional cases permission could be obtained to complete the 
modernization of existins; industrial units. The Brazilian 
company concerned also had to agree not to dispose of the 
machinery during its normal economic life an:l not to make 
any direct payment abroad corres:pondin,g to its value. 
The treatment under Instruction 113 was clearly 
much more advantageous to foreign investors than the alter-
native of sending dollars into Brazil at the free market 
rate and using the cruzeiros thus obtained to repurchase 
dollars at a hi;rher price in the auction market. ~2he meas-
ure of the advanta,?e was the difference between the cost 
of forei.r;n exch~mse in the relevant auction category and 
the free market rate. For :lollar imnorts this differential 
has at most times been very substantial. For machinery 
from non-dollar sources the differential was r::ener2vlly 
smaller and occasionally negative. These c_ifferences among 
currencies largely disapneared with the achievement of 
currency convertibility by most major exporting cotmtries 
at the end of 1958. 
'11he size of the advantage under the provisions 
of Instruction 113 has varied throug-h time. Thus the date 
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of investment is of imuortance in judging its significance. 
For example, in September 1956, dollars purchased in the 
relevant auction category* w·ere 109% more exnensive than 
dollars purchased in the free market. In September 1957, 
this price differenti9l had decreased to 12;1o. By then the 
new tariff had been introduced and exemption from )art or 
all of the duties was more significant than Instruction 
113 as such. By September 1958 the differential between 
the free rate and auction dollars for machinery imports 
had ag--c1in increased to about 40%, to fall back to 10% a 
year later and rise again to roughly 2276 in August 1960. 
In the sprin~ of 1961, when general category imports were 
all transferred to the free exchange market, the differen-
tial ceased to exist. 
For most com-oanies that h2.ve availed themselves 
of the benefits of Instruction 113 and surrr:lementary duty 
reductions, the resulting cost savings do not aunear to 
have been a decisive factor in the investment decisions. 
These comuanies vrere principally motivated by self-pro-
tection in antici Dation of the operation of the lav.,r of 
similars, or by normal business considerations of staking 
out a share in an attractive market or exoanclin"3: that 
* Imports were classified in five different cate-
gories, dependins; on their essentiality. Exchange certi-
ficates were made availeble in senarate auctions-for each 
category and prices paid depended on demand as well as 
exchange allocations made for each category. 
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share. This vras less true for companies that h<1d no for-
mer import position to protect, and for whose nroduct the 
market prospects were less certain. 
Instruction 113 has also made it possible for 
companies which had been considerin~ investment or expan-
sion in Brazil, but vvhich lacked sufficient investment 
funds, to employ 1.1sed eqnipment rather than cs.sh. IJany 
situations occur in which a U.S. cor;:pany has available 
used equi1Jment that may be profitably employed in a devel-
oping country. It may be available because the company 
has been unsuccessful in a particular line of manufacturing 
in the United States, because the machinery has been re-
placed by more advanced equipment to save high-cost labor, 
or, in the case of dies and tooling, because market cond-
itions at home necessitate the introduction of new models 
at regular intervals. In at least one case in the auto-
motive parts industry, this feature of Instruction 113 seems 
to have been decisive. (Harvard study.) 
Perhaps the most important influence of Instruc-
tion 113 has been its symbolism as a si,gn of ·welcome to 
foreign investors and its advertising effect in attracting 
the attention of foreign enterprises without previous bus-
iness experience in Brazil. There was an impressive coin-
cidence betvveen the institution of the Instruction and a 
large increase in foreign private capital inf+ow into 
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Brazil, much of it involving companies new to the Brazilian 
scene. An executive in one of the companies studied said 
"it was not Instruction 113 that made us decide to go into 
Brazil, but the investment climate that it represented." 
Of course, it should be pointed out that these words were 
spoken before Governor Brizola, brother-in-law of Presi-
dent Goulart, expropriated a subsidiary of ITT early in 
1962 at which time the investment climate chilled somewhat. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE AUT OTvmrrrVE PR OGRAli:I 
3.1. The Incentives Offered b~_qEIA 
In a number of instances the Brazilian government 
has promoted the establishment of new industries by offer-
ing favorable import treatment for manufacturing equipment 
and, for a limited period of time, raw materials and com-
ponents. The outstanding effort of this type was the 
program for the establishment of an automotive manufactur-
ing industry in Brazil, institued in 1956 under the direc-
tion of the GEIA (Executive Group for the Automotive 
Industry). Similar programs have subsequently been devel-
oped for shipbuilding, tractors, automatic telephone 
equipment and certain types of heavy machinery. However, 
it is the automotive program in which U.S. manufacturers 
have played the most prominent role. 
Prior to the institution of GEIA. there was no 
automotive manufacturing in the proper sense of the word 
in Brazil. Several assembly operations existed, mostly 
operated by foreign firms, the first ones dating back as 
far as 1919. In addition, a considerable number of local 
and some foreign firms were producine certain parts for 
the replacement market, such as tires, batteries, springs, 
glass, paint and upholstery. In 1952, 104 such i terns vv-ere 
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registered as similars and consequently excluded from the 
issuance of import licenses.36 
Early in the 1950's intensive discussion began 
of the possibility of establishing a Brazilian automotive 
industry. Various U.S. automotive manufacturers were con-
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sulted by the Brazilian government on the production targets 
and methods of operation that would be technically feasible 
and on the form that an incentive program should take. 
The GEIA was established in 1956. The essential features 
of its program involved far-reaching benefits in the im-
portation of manufacturing equipment and of automotive 
components for a limited period of years, in return for 
a firm commitment by the automotive companies for the pro-
gressive replacement of imports by Brazilian-made components 
backed up by specific plans for the "deletion" of imports. 
Implicit in the program, of course, w<:=;,s the prospect that 
non-participating companies would be excluded from the 
Brazilian market, perhaps for all time. 
Under the laws and decrees ere a ting the GE IA 
program the following favors were extended to imDorts of 
manufacturing equipment for the automotive industry. In 
the first place, such equipment would automatically be 
avvarded Instruction 113 treatment. Secondly, firms that 
36L. Gordon and E. Grommers, op.cit., p. 46. 
were unable to bring in their entire industrial equipment 
as a foreign investment in kind, under Instruction 113, 
would be granted preferential cost-of-exchange treatment 
for debt financing with a. minimum. repayment period of five 
years. Finally, for a period of thirty months such equip-
ment would be exempted from import duties (and also con-
sumption taxes). 
Although the incentives in the GEIA program con-
sisted largely of exchange and tariff measures, certain 
other types of benefits were also made available. Automo-
tive projects vvere to be classified among "basic industries" 
with respect to financial assistance from the National 
Development Bank. Entry of technicians into the countries 
was to be facilitated. The basic decree also contained 
the following assurance:: 
The incentives reserved for the automo-
tive industry shall, preferably, be 
directed toward private enterprise pro-jects, the government abstaining from 
stimulating the institution of new state 
entities dedicated to similar activities.37 
The question of government competition was not 
purely academic, since the Brazilian government had laid 
the groundwork for possible participation in the automotive 
business in 1948 with the establishment of the Fabrica 
Nacional de Motores (FNM). This company, originally 
37 Decree No. 39,412, June 16, 1956, Art. 21. 
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en5dged in assembling tractors, did in fact participate 
in the GEIA program, making trucks and passenger cars 
under license from Alfa-Romeo, but on a relatively modest 
scale. 
The incentives of the GEL~ proeTam were not 
available to every autonotive firm desiring to enter the 
country. The basic purpose of the program was to stimu-
late only so much investment as was necessary to satisfy 
a liberal estimate of the future market demand of the 
country. Among other the follovring selection criteria 
were employed by GEIA. Projects submitted had to call for 
engine production either in the manufacturer's own factory 
or by subcontractors under his responsibility. Encourage-
ment was given to arrangements for intensive recourse to 
external Brazilian suppliers and subcontractors for produc-
tion of specialized parts. It was intended by these means 
to build a large Brazilian industry of noncaptive compon-
ent makers. 
Applying companies would have to assume the ob-
ligations posed by the component nationalization schedule. 
The projects submitted had to show the expected method of 
compliance with this program. 
The vehicle manufactvxers were free to select 
the components that they would schedule first for nation-
alization, but in reviewing the plans the GEL~ authorities 
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took nains to see that the proposed investment in e~uipment 
did in fact conform with the companies' stated plans. In 
a nQmber of instances, the GEIA rejected pronosals that 
it felt were designed to take advantage of the liberal im-
port arrangements for a few years, but not to lead ultim-
ately to a genuine manufacturing industry. In addition, 
GETA. deliberately fostered truck, bus and "jeep"-style 
vehicle production ahead of passenger cars, regarding the 
former as indispensable to national economic development 
and the latter as something of a luxury. 
Out of eleven companies undertaking the manufac-
turing of vehicles within the GEIA program, four are U.S. 
firms. Table 5 gives the 1959 and 1960 production of each, 
divided among the four basic GEIA product categories. In 
three cases, the Brazilian affiliate is wholly ovvned by 
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the parent company; the fourth is a joint venture controlled 
by the U.S. firm. 
the Harvard study. 
All four companies were interviewd in 
For all of them the GEIA program was 
the decisive factor in the decision to initiate local 
manufacturing. 
The knowledge that importation of vehicles, in 
finished form as well as "completely knocked dmvn" for local 
assembly, would henceforth be impossible was a powerful 
stimulus. In all cases, the company managements felt that 
the potential market in Brazil was too good to lose and 
TABLE 5 
PRODUCTION OF AUTOii:OTIVE VEHICLES, 1959 and 1960 
(in units) 
Trucks and Buses 
Fabrica Nacional de Motores 
Ford Motor do Brasil 
General Motors do Brasil 
International Harvester 
Mercedes do Brasil 
Scania Vabis 
Utility Vehicles 
Ford Motor do Brasil 
General Motors do Brasil 
Vemag S.A. (DI{W) 
Volkswagen do Brasil 
Willys Overland do :Brasil 
"Jee;e"-tYPe Vehicles 
Toyota do Brasil 
Vemag S .A. (DKvV) 
Willys Overland do Brasil 
Pass_ep._g_er Cars 
Fabrica Nacional de Motores 
(Alfa-Romeo) 
Romi Isetta (bubble cars) 
Simca do Brasil 
Vemag S .A. (DKW) 
Volkswagen do Brasil 
Willys Over do Brasil (Dauphine 
and Aero Willys) 
Grand Total 
SOURCE: GEIA 
1959 
2,079 
12,483 
14,011 
833 
9,821 
429 
39,656 
4,755 
3,153 
2,524 
8,383 
72593 
26,408 
489 
1,968 
152721 
18,178 
1,264 
1,773 
8,454 
_ _5_10 
12,001 
96,243 
1960 
2,544 
13,325 
13,962 
1,207 
10,591 
__ 593 
42,222 
5,767 
4,214 
4,446 
11,299 
8.640 
34,366 
295 
2,481 
162748 
19,524 
400 
446 
3,633 
3,097 
17,059 
_;g_,~?..L 
38,259 
----
134,371 
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that prior investments in assembly and distribution fac-
ilities (amounting to many millions of dollars in some 
cases) and goodwill acquired in the import business had 
to be safeguarded by moving into complete manufacture. 
Tvvo other large U.S. automotive :firms, ho".'ever, 
which had also previously been ex-oortin:::; to Brazil, did 
not present formal proposals to m-;r.[\_ al thour~h they did 
engage in preliminary discussions. In the mid-1950's, 
both of these companies were having difficulties in their 
domestic business. They also bad had less experience with 
direct foreign investments than had the other U.S. firms 
involved. 
The announced policy of GEIA that benefits were 
only to be offered to a limited number of companies, com-
bined with the requirement of rapid nationalization of the 
content of the product in order to remain a beneficiary 
of the various advantacses, resulted in prompt decisions 
to go ahead on the part of most firms involved. It must 
be remembered, in this context, that the program had been 
m1.cler discussion for some time prior to its :formal enact-
ment. ConsiderL' ble authority was delegated to s-:;;;1;', by the 
Brazilian government, enabling the a.q;ency to act efficiently 
and with a minimum of bureaucratic delay; this factor also 
contributed to the remarke.bly speedy establis!unent of the 
industry. 
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c\n attendant advanta:c;e of the m·~ :C.' incentive 
system, namel;:,r the :90ssibili ty of importinr~ rf,COncJi tioned 
sets of complete namufacturing equipment from the United 
States, was also of importance in the vehicle industry. 
One corapany was thus able to find new productive employ-
ment for large parts of an assembly line that, although 
still in good technical condition, had become redundant 
in the United States. 
Desni te the evidence that some overco:oaci tv has 
. "' 
been created, the total effect of the GEIA l)ro.r:;r'.iTI on the 
Brazilian economy would appear to have been very bene-
ficial. Apart from the advantage of foreign exchange 
savings and increased employment opportunities, there are 
a number of less measurable aclvantages. The lJrogram offers 
a strikin.cz; exaro.ple of the effect of 11 backwc;.rrl linka;:;e" in 
the process of economic development. It stimulated the 
growth of a large parts supply indPstry. It also stimu-
lated local production of inportant raw materials such as 
steel, synthetic rubber and glass. Some of the new nlants 
and manufacturing methods installed to meet automotive needs 
may also be employed for the manufacttiTe of other ]Jroducts. 
One producer had found an interesting complementary 1)ro-
duct for its body and assembly shop in refrigerators. Cap-
acity now exists for various types of castings, forgings 
and machinings that can be used in many nonautomotive 
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fields, for which Brazilian demand was too small prior to 
the GEl!\ .. program, to bring about the establishment of the 
necessary facilities. 
Creation of the automotive industry, fine.lly, 
has resulted in a widespread dissemination of new techniques. 
Wholly :Brazilian-owned suppliers and subcontractors, and 
other Brazilian firms that have engaged in joint ventures 
with foreign companies, are benefitting from the newly 
acquired technological and managerial skills, not only in 
the manufacture of al..ltomotive parts, but also in the im-
provement and expansion of other lines of business. The 
new labor skills are available to the entire ranf;e of 
Brazilian industry. 
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OE~R.'riNG IN AN ll~FLATIONAHY ="]~VIHOEI:IENT 
4.1. Effect and Character of Postwar Inflation 
Chronic and large-scale inflation has been the 
most prominent feature of the Brazilian economic environ-
ment in the postwar period. ·rhe general causes and con-
sequences of this phenomenon are matters of hot dispute, 
in Brazil as elsewhere in Latin America. Equally disputed 
is the question of the best methods for bringing inflation 
under control. 
Inflation has not stopped economic growth in 
Brazil, although there are.: serious doubts whether it has 
made a positive contribution to growth. The economy has 
shown a surprising capacity to adapt itself to inflation, 
so that many of the normal effects, such as redistribution 
of income from workers to entrepreneurs and flight of cap-
ital abroad, have not occured in major degree. Inflation 
has, however, involved distortion in the pattern of invest-
ment, discouragement of small savings, serious impediments 
to the smooth functioning of financial institutions, and 
severe social tensions as various groups in the comn1unity 
seek to protect their incomes from falling behind the in-
creases in the cost of living. In addition, inflation 
creates obvious complications for foreign business opera-
tions as well as posing serious problems for governmental 
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financing operations. 
Pervasive inflation obviously affects many types 
of business decisions, directly or indirectly. It is a 
fundamental source of tax problemB encovntered by the U.S. 
investor in Brazil. It is of even greater influence in 
the area of business finance, affecting the need for vvork-
ing capital and the supplies of short and long-term fltnds. 
Shortages of foreign exchange and the resulting system of 
import controls are also related, although less directly, 
to the inflationary process. 
Inflation is by no means a new experience for 
the Brazilian economy. Between 1808 and 1937 there was a 
thirty-fivefold decline in the Brazilian currency in rela-
tion to gold and about four times that decline in ~Jurchasing 
power. 38 ri:his is equivalent to a steady inflation of 4% 
per year, but the actual process was r8,ther one of intervc::~ls 
of price stability, interspersed with periods of severe, 
but never runaway, price increases. Sharp inflation oc-
curred, for example, in the 1840's and 1890's, and at the 
close of World War I. The current phase, however, has 
lasted continuously for the twenty-five years since the 
mid-1930's, being especially marked during World War II 
as ·well as in recent years. 
38Roberto C. Simonsen, Economic History of Brazil, 
(Sao Paulo, 1957), pp. 73-74. 
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Table 6 gives two indicators of inflation for 
the years 1945 - 196G. While both the cost of living 
iridex and the wholesale price index are statistically weak, 
they give a fair general impression of the environment 
within which the participating companies (Harvard study) 
have operated. It will be noted that the rate of infla-
tion was between 1 and 2% a month throughout the period, 
except for the late 1940's, and reached even higher levels 
in recent times. 
There has been an important shift in the ,cseneral 
impact of this inflationary process on private enterprise 
in Brazil during the cou.rse of the postwar :period. In the 
earlier years the expansion of private investment, financed 
partly by bank credit, was itself a leading factor in the 
inflation. Since 1956, hmvever, governmental deficit fin-
ancing has become the major inflationary element, and there 
has been a series of efforts to restrict the expansion of 
private credit in order to keen the inflation from get tint~~ 
comnletely out of hand. 
The major elements in the large governmental de-
ficits of recent years have been the increasing burdens of 
financing coffee surpluses, large-sc'le public investments 
in development of economic infrastructure, especially trans-
portation and electric power, the construction of the new 
capital at Brazilia, and the heavy operating deficits of 
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TA:BLE 6 
BRAZILIAN INDICA-rCRS OF DiFLA.TION, 1945-1960 
Year 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
Cost of Living (Rio) 
(1948 = 100) 
Index 
68 
79 
97 
100 
104 
114 
128 
150 
172 
210 
259 
313 
363 
417 
580 
750 
Annual 
Change 
16% 
23 
3 
4 
9 
12 
17 
15 
22 
23 
21 
16 
15 
39 
29 
Annual Rate 
Compounded 17% 
Wholesale Prices-General 
(1948 = 100) 
Index 
75 
86 
91 
100 
109 
124 
148 
163 
188 
245 
277 
330 
371 
417 
574 
750 
Annual 
Change 
15% 
6 
10 
9 
14 
19 
10 
15 
30 
13 
19 
12 
12 
37 
31 
16% I 
------- ------------·--- ··-- ----~-----
somwE:: Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura 3~onomics, 
Tiiay, 1961. 
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certain governmental enterprises, notably railroads and 
coastal shipning. Continuing large public na~~olls have 
added to the burden. While isproved social capital over-
head is of great importance to manufacturing industry, the 
short-term effect on business of the shift in the main 
source of inflationary pressure has been to tighten private 
credit availabilities at the very time that needs for work-
ing capital were expandin,'S. 
4.2. Impact of Inflation on Industrial Operations 
The central operating problems posed for u.s. 
business in Brazil by the inflationary envirorLrnent involve 
keeping prices ahead of costs and obtaining sufficient 
working capital. Chronic inflation also creates a ~eneral 
sense of managerial malaise, absorbing a great deal of ex-
ecutive time and attention which ought to be reserved for 
normal business operations or long-term planning. In addi-
tion, there are technical and conceptual problems in work-
ing out satisfactory internal accounting procedures for 
the subsidiary, and practices for translating cruzeiro 
statements into dollars for reporting to the parent com-
pany. The uneven course of inflation complicatGs this 
task, and multiple exchange rates add further difficulties. 
There is also the need for constant attention to ways and 
means of minir:rizing depreciation losses on cruzeiro accounts 
and locating, tap:oing and preserving external sources of 
121 
short and long-term capital. Market forecasting and es-
timating costs of future expansions become largely a matter 
of guesswork, because of uncertainty concerning the course 
and impact of governmental efforts to contain the infla-
tion. In addition, employee morale is affected ~Y uneven-
ness in the upward movements of wages and the cost of 
livine;, and it is difficult to work out effective systems 
of wage incentives. 
The normal business objective in an inflationary 
situation is to adjust prices in such a way that increas-
ing costs are fully passed on to the consumc;r. ·The com-
panies in the Harvard study have devised varions pricing 
policies to achieve this purpose. In general they involve 
some effort to project replacement costs. A forecast is 
made of the estimated increase in the cost of livine; and 
the deterioration of the cruzeiro exchange rate, us11ally 
on the basis of recent experience. The rate most commonly 
used was 20% annually. The practical operation of this 
policy involves several difficulties. The actual rate of 
inflation is irregv.lar. An allowance of 205~ v1ould have 
worked adequately for most of the 1950's, but from 1959 
onward inflation accelerated considerably and un:nredictab-
ili ty, and many co:r:roanies have felt the resul tin,j cost-price 
squeeze. Even if the pace of inflation could be reliably 
foreseen, the question remains whether the price increases 
calculated accordingly can be realized. 
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For some types of companies, there are practical 
difficulties involved i! these price changes are going to 
be made. This is particularly true for those companies 
that manufacttrre a large and varied line of consumers' 
goods, marketed thrOUi;?:h a widespread distribution system. 
One con;pany in the study nevertheless reported six succes-
sive price lists in a sinsle year. 
Consurner and dealer resistance to !)rice increases 
can constitute a serious barrier. In addition, there may 
be cost increc:;~ses, over and above the increases in -vva._2;es 
and in prices of raw materials, -;vhich it is hard to incor-
porate promptly into sales nrices. One c01'11}1any re:oortea. 
being forced by inflationary conditions to assmne distri-
bution and marketing costs that norme,lly '.VOu_ld be borne 
by its distributors. ?or certain consumers' .q;oods, it may 
be possible for a time to maintain the appearance of stab+e 
prices by reducing the weight of the unit sold, or by 
lowering the q_uali ty of raw materials, bv_t this line of 
action cannot nrovide a lasting solution. Companies that 
supply other manufacturers are in a better position than 
producers of consumers' :?:Oods. Their sc;.les contracts often 
contain escalator clauses which link sales prices to wage 
levels and raw material prices and provide for immediate 
and automatic increases as costs go up. 
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For most of the companies partici~r,J8. tin~=: in the 
Harvard stud;)T during the 1950's, the rate of net JJrofi t 
on sales tended to decrease since the rise in production 
costs could not be fully regained from the consumers. 
Even vvhen :9rices could be adjusted relatively rapidly and 
smoothly, it was generally not possible to compensate for 
the extra tax liabilities resulting from the inflation. 
The Brazilian tax system, it should be pointed out, does 
not allow revaluation of inventories for income tax nur-
poses and bases depreciation allowances for equi:oment on 
historical instead of replacement costs. 
Table 7 gives some indication of the percentage 
return on LJ.S. direct manufacturing investments in Brazil 
as a whole. The data should be read •,vi th sui table reser-
vations, since reporting methods are not uniform, differing 
practices are used for conversion of cruzeiros to dollars 
and income not derived from dividends and interest is ex-
cluded. Many U.S. com:oanies receive additional incor:1e 
through royalties on licenses and. through technical assis-
tance fees. It should be pointed out, also, that the 
apparent high rates of profit in the years before 1953 re-
flect in considerable degree the overvaluation of the 
cruzeiro at that time. In a sense, the rFLtes are not so 
much a measure of the true profitability of d.oinq; business 
in Brazil du .. ring that period as they are an indication of 
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TABLE 7 
PROFI1rABILITY OF UNITED ST"\ ·ms I/li\NlJF/',_CTLJRllfG 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
SOURCE: 
UTVESTT/iENrr ll~ BRAZIL, 1946-1960 
Total Net 3arn-
ings as % of 
Boo~ Value 
14.3% 
21.6 
22.3 
18.8-
16.2 
28.0 
25.6 
17.7 
14.2 
9.9 
10.2 
11.4 
8.3 
8.9 
11.3 
Earnings Remitted 
to U.S. as % of 
Book Value 
6.4% 
9.3 
6.2 
5.3 
6.0 
9.7 
6.8 
8.4 
4.9 
2.0 
2.2 
4.5 
2.8 
2.0 
5.1 
Retained 
Earnin.:;s as 
% of Book 
Value 
7.9% 
12.3 
16.1 
13.5 
10.2 
18.3 
18.8 
9.3 
9.3 
7.9 
8.0 
6.9 
5.5 
6.9 
6.0 
-~----~--~- ·-----------
Bureau of Business Economics, U. s. Department of 
Cormnerce (quoted from L. Gordon and E. Grommers, 
£E.• cit.). 
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the subsidy then bein,cs accorded to Brazil's foreign ex-
change policy. 
4.3. Impact of Inflation on Investment Decisions 
On the whole, despite its many unfavorable effects, 
chronic inflation by itself does not a:opear to have dis-
couraged the participating companies from ~our suing a broad 
course of action determined on the basis of underlying 
economic and business considerations. There are cases, 
however, where companies with a generally conservative 
economic outlook have been deterred by the inflationary 
climate from making an initial investment. An executive 
of one of the companies in the survey, which entered into 
two Brazilian ventures in order to preserve existing ex-
port markets agdinst loss due to the law of si~ilars, stated 
that they had turned dovm a number of additional projects 
"because of uncertainty, particularly relating to the in-
flationary policies ofthe country. 11 Significantly, he 
added, "Vlhile some of these investments might have paid 
their way, I am q_u.ite certain that they would not have been 
particularly profitable because of the difficulties of 
operating in an inflationary economy." 
The basic attitude of U.S. investors in the face 
of Brazilian inflation clearly depends in large measure on 
subjective and even arbitrary factors. Whether the execu-
tives concerned are generally pessimistic or optimistic in 
temperament appears to be as important to their decisions 
in this field as an objective evaluation of onerating ex-
perience. This point is well brought out in a 1957 report 
of the Legislation and Economic Policy Corunittee of the 
American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil:39 
Pessimistic Viewpoint 
Wiany manufacturers, in particular those who pro-
duce consumer goods of either a luxury nature or for which 
demand is deferrable, have experienced their sharpest de-
cline in sales in many years. 
Consumers, caught in the inflationary spiral, 
are being forced increasingly to concentrate their prtr-
chases on essentials. ':rhis is reflected un the chain from 
ret':5ler, to deD.ler, to distributor and, finglly, to the 
manufacturer. The dovmward tendency in consumer purchases 
of luxury goods and appliances has been slowed somewhat 
by longer terms on installmeont selling which, however, 
have not been sufficient to reverse the trend. 
To many industrialists, the above situation has 
all the signs of recession caused by a too rapid unchecked 
inflation which has raised costs faster than income at 
all levels. When this is combined ·."i th the ~rea sing short-
age of credit, industrialists who follow this line of 
thought are either reducing, or planning to reduce, oper-
ations and production. 
Optimistic Viewpoint 
Other industrialists, however, including some 
new to Brazil, and others with long-standing operations, 
take a different, perhaps longer range view. They consider 
that Brazil is an expanding economy whose real production 
is inadequate to meet real demand, existing or potential. 
Yvhile not entirely discounting the significance of the 
recent cost inflation, they simply regard this movement 
39Brazilian Business, July 1957, p. 37. 
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as characteristic of the secular inflationary curve which 
has characterized the Brazilian economy for over half a 
century. 
They are keyin':1' their investment plans to esti-
mates of the future Brazilian BB.rket. In so doing, they 
are expressing an ir.J1erent faith in the old local axiom 
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that increased prices \Vill prevail, thus providing a safety-
valve which more than offsets increased operating costs. 
The majority of the companies in the Harvard 
study leaned toward the optimistic rather than the nessi-
mistic side. They drew a sharp distinction, however, 
between Brazil's broadly favorable environment of rapid 
growth and attractive investment climate, on the one hand, 
and the phenomenon of chronic inflation, on the other. 
Whatever their success in adapting their operations to in-
flationary conditions, they regarded continuing inflation 
as a serious inconvenience to current business operations. 
It v1as a major added factor of uncertainty in their forward 
planning and a potential source of real danger to tb.e long-
run stability of the covntry and therefore to their ovvn 
ultimate business prospects. 
CHl\.PTER V 
CONDITIONS r'l.}il) POLICY !I_FFECTING L.\:SOR SUPPLY 
5.1. Labor and Social Legislation 
Labor and social legislation cause a few prob-
lems. A particularly unfavorable reputation has been 
earned by the so-called "stability rule" vrhich restricts 
the discharge of employees who havereen employed for ten 
years or lonr:;er. Essentially, this rule provides that 
such employees may be discharged only under certain 
conditions. 
First, in a strictly defined and limited number 
of cases, such as liquidation of btlsiness, relocation in 
another city, and closing of a part of a shop, discharge 
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is allowed if special approval of a labor court is obtained. 
In this case, an indemnity must be paid, equivalent to 
two months' wages for each year of employment. (If the 
employment contract is terminated during the first ten 
years, an indemnity is due of only one month's v.ra~:es for 
each year of employment.) As a result of this rule, a 
decision to move or close do\vn a plant becomes quite costly 
if many workers have been employed for a long time. To 
prepare for eventualities of this kind, employers have 
had to build up so-called "indemnity reserves" by retain-
ing a fixed percentage of the total payroll. It must be 
noted, however, that the liability in case of plant 
relocation is waived if the employer offers to continue 
employment at the new location at a wage increase of 257~, 
which must be tendered by the company. 
Secondly, an employee may be discharged in the 
case of "serious misconduct" proved to the satisfaction 
of the labor court; in this case no indemnity is due. 
Although it has generally been possible to obtain court 
approval in cases of extreme misbehavior, employers feel 
that the "stability rule" makes it practically imuossible 
to remove workers who have considerably reduced their 
efforts after reaching the ten-year line but without com-
mitting any serious misdemeanor. 
The stability rule is considered basics,lly un-
sound from an economic point of view. The cost of building 
up indemnity reserves is naturally reflected in the price 
of the product. Moreover, the fact that plant relocation 
results either in a 25% pay raise to all emnloyees or in 
payment of stability indemnity may obstruct a ulant relo-
cation that Vlould be in the interests both of the ccmpany 
and the Brazilian economy. One partici 1.)ating firm that 
purchased an existing Brazilian concern, thus assuming 
stability liability for its personnel, and that subse-
quently moved the factory from Sao Paulo to Cam"!Jinas, fou.nd 
that the situation was not as bad in nractice as it may 
appear in theory. If offered continuing enployment to all 
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workers at the new site at a 25% increased wage, thus 
avoiding any liability for indemnity payment. Only a 
small percentage of the rrorkers accepted the offer, and 
those were largely persons vvhOLl the com0any was hapl)y to 
keep desuite the wage increase. 
Wage rates in Brazil are be" sed on minimum wages 
established by the e;overnment after consul tu tion with me:.m-
ufacturers and labor syndicates. The minima differ for 
various regions of the country. They are periodically 
revised and adjusted to increases in the cost of living. 
Wage scales for semi-skilled and skilled labor lie consid-
erably above the minimum and tend to rise prO})Ortionately 
when the minimum wage rate is adjusted. During the inter-
vals between the periodic adjustments, the purchasing 
power of wac;es is always being reduced by the continuin:.:s 
rise in the cost of living. It is not uncommon for manu-
facturing companies, anxious to maintain labor :morale, to 
anticinate the official minimum wage increases by earlier 
voluntary action. 
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There is a considerable body of social legisla-
tion in Brazil providing for such benefits as paid vacations, 
partly paid sick leave, accident insurance and retironwnt 
pensions. It is difficult to compute exactly the total 
nonwage labor costs, but they have been estimated, together 
with voluntary contributions such as low-cost housing 
provided by employers to employees, free trans~ortation, 
subsidized meals, etc., at roughly 40% of wac;es for un-
skilled workers, decreasing to 20% for employees in the 
higher wage brackets.4° This comnares with the overall 
average of 30% in Argentina. The companies participating 
in the study did not consider these costs to be unreason-
ably high. ~hey did, however, raise objections to the 
governmental pension l)lan, which is based on fixed bene-
fits that are completely inadequate in view of the infla-
tion. Many of the companies felt that the system was not 
satisfactorily administered, and if the companies were 
allowed instead to institute voluntary retire:oent nlans, 
real benefits would be considerably larger. Some of the 
firms made arranrr,ements to supnlement the various social 
benefits. 
The Brazilian trade union movement in its con-
temporary form dates from the period of the early 1930's, 
when the Vargas administration was attempting to institute 
a corporate state. The dictator retained the approval of 
labor through elaborate welfare programs and by im"t)osing 
restrictions and obligations on management. At the same 
time he maintained strict federal control over the labor 
---------·----~--
4°william B. Tiale, Brazil; Factors Affectin~ 
Foreign Investment, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1960) p. 60. 
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movement as a Guarantee to the business community that 
labor would not be permitted to get out of hand. r~he pat-
terns established in those days are still clearly discern-
ible. Most matters subject to collective bar03-ining in 
the United States are regulated by law in Brazil. The 
government also exercises considerable influence over or-
ganizational structure and activities of the unions; labor 
courts play an important role in adjudicating labor-Tian-
agement disputes; and where there is collective bargaining, 
management and labor confront each other on the national 
level through industry-wide federations, rather than in 
individual companies or plants. 
Since the termination of the Vargas dictatorship 
in 1945, the right to strike has been reco~nized by the 
constitution. The comDanies studied renort that in gen-
eral their relations with the labor syndicates are satis-
factory. They experienced relatively few strikes, no 
doubt partly because they offered considerable fringe 
benefits, tended to pay wages above the average, and fre-
quently adjusted wages to cost-of-living increases in 
anticination of official increases in the minimum wage 
rate. 
Technical, administrative and managerial skills 
on all levels are relatively scarce in Brazil.4l Althou0h 
41.... . ' .. , . 
vnlllam t:P• Dale, op. cl t., p. 61 
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the government has adopted new educational policies in 
recent years with a view to improving facilities for gen-
eral and technical education, the experience of the 
partici~ating companies shows that industrial firms have 
been compelled to undertake consideraole training Drograms 
of their own. 'rhe dissemination of skills throu:co;h these 
training pro.:;.rams appears to have constituted an important 
contribution by U.S. and other foreign comnanies to national 
economic development. 
All particinatin.g companies in the Harvard study 
are either employing Brazilians in high-level technical 
and managerial positions, or are preparinc; theTI to take 
over such resr)onsibilities in the future. A normal nart 
of this preparation is an extensive neriod of training 
in parent company plants in the United States, B1rrope or 
occasionally other Latin American com~anies. Ronghly 
60~0 of the participa tin{s companies state as their uolicy 
the future transfer of all managerial responsioili ti';s 
to Brazilians. 'rhe remaining companies rlo not believe 
in complete "Brazilianiza tionn of mana '3:emcmt 2"nd T)refer 
to keep at least a few U.S. citizens on the sDot as a 
link betvveen the 3razilian operation and the ·narent com-
pany. ·.vhile most of the companies in this -voup prefer 
to reserve the position of ;<;eneral manager for a U.S. citi-
zen, this is by no means true of all. Some of the largest 
ones employ Brazilian general managers, or have eBployed 
them in the past, and depend on the treasurer, controller 
or some other high-level officer as the u.s. link with 
the home office.42 
Technical functions are often Brazilianized 
earlier than general executive and financial ftmctions. 
The motive of effectivel~r maintaining control ( "reore-
senting our shareholders," as one parent com]Jany executive 
in the study put it) appears to be the dominant con::-Jider-
ation behind this policy. i\ typical situ.ation is that 
of a participating company which employs U.S. citizens 
in the position of ~eneral manager, finance mana~er and 
controller, and Brazilians in the positions of sales mana-
:S;er, nersonnel manar~er and public reL,.tions mana,c;er. 
With respect to delays in achievin,T, the ts.rget 
of complete 5razilianization, it is interestine to note 
the recent findings of Shearer's stv<J~r of hic';h-1svel nan-
pmver in Brazilian subsidiaries of U.S. corrP•anies. 43 He 
points out that announced home office policies of reclucin:.; 
the proportion of U.S. manaserial personnel abroac'l_ are not 
alvvays matched by actual results. Shearer concludes that 
----------------------~-
4 2John Fayerweather, Management of Interm-J.tional 
Opera i~~ns (McGraw-Hill, New Yon;"-T9-60T;--:pp -:-J12:::'J75-. --
43John C. Shearer, Hi~-Level Mannovver in Over-
seas -~~bsidi(?.ries_ (Princeton, 1 0), -·--pp .29-;·-~·r<J;-1:"22-125'. 
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a major reason for this discrepancy can be found in the 
attitude of job protection on the part of u.s. citizens 
currently employed in the top managerial positions of the 
foreien subsidiary. It vvould a~mear that unless there is 
careful career planning by the parent comnanies for their 
overseas executives, these men are unlikely to be enthus-
iastic about preparing local manpower for their own 
replacement. Unfortunately, there is no basis for judging 
how far Shearer's conclusions may be valid for the sample 
of comranies in the Harvard study. 
All the participating companies provided some 
form of snecial training in technical and clerical skills 
for lower level manpower. Except for occasional training 
trips of foremen and technicians to narent nlants in the 
United States, this is normally done in the plant, with 
the assistance of employees temporarily broun:ht doVTn from 
the parent company. 
Part of the on-the-spot training takes place 
vdthin the framework of the national apprenticeship system 
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( SEFAI), which is financed by a levy on -oayrolls and under 
which employers are sup-oosed to train at least 57'S of their 
totsl labor force. It seems that the particiDatinp: com-
panies generally go well beyond the ST~I\.!1 I minimum require-
ments in their own training programs. In several instances, 
particularly among the larger comnanies, the training 
programs not only encompass the teaching of specific tech-
nical skills, but also include elementary and even advanced 
general education. Of one comyany it has been reported 
that at any given time approximately lO;G of factory and 
office personnel are attending voluntary courses, to which 
company and employee each contribute half of the time, 
and in -vvhich vvorkers are offered general education and 
an opportunity to upgrade their skills.44 
The general feeling is that Brazilian labor is 
basically of good quality and acquires technical skills 
easily and rapidly. A t~oical manufacturer of technically 
complicated automotive parts, which started wholly ov-med 
operations in 1959, already employs in its tool shop about 
70 Brazilian machinists, mostly trsined on the job, out 
of a total labor force of 600.45 
44Theodore Geiger, The General Electric Compant 
in Brazil, National Planning Association Case Study (Was -
ington, ~961) p. 61 
45L. Gordon and E. Grommers, op. cit., p. 114. 
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CHi\. PTER VI 
6.1. The Joint Venture Po::.ttern 
Every Uni teet 3t8. tes compr.my that decides to mb.ke 
a direct investment abroad is confrontecl. i 0h th8 choice 
whether to est8.blish ~;_ >.ihOj_ly owned subsic1iary or to en-
g'clge in a ;x::.rtnership with a local enter,)ris;:O or \7i th 
local individue.ls. In several less develo<Je:::~. countries, 
_:sovernment~::..l policies in:t·luence the choice of the would-be 
investor; it is stron,rsly suggested or ~")rescribed th2.t a 
minimum percentaee, perhaps even a majority, of the stocl-:: 
of any industrial enternrise or of companies in s ·;ecified 
fields be nationally ovmed. The Brazili~n ::;overnment has 
not imposed restrictions of this nature since the c:.mdi:ng 
of the Vargas dictatorship in 1946. The only exce-;Jtion 
would be in the few areas ':rhere no foreign investment is 
allowed. Governmental policies do a"'::l:)ear to have C?;iven 
some preference to joint ventures in the form of ::::~.id for 
clevelopment financing. Hmvever, so little .. ;overnment fin--
ancing has been made availc-oble to manufacturing industry 
that this has not constituted an important inducem.fmt to 
the formation of joint ventures. 
The availability of Instruction 113 treatment 
to firms with foreign particip2.tion, cmnbined vvi th the 
reluctance of the authorities to assist :raanuf::;.cturing 
firms in obtaining public dollar loans for the importation 
of equipment, has operated as an incentive to Brazilian 
companies to take in foreign partners, but not as an in-
ducement to foreign companies to do the reverse; it has 
even tended to reduce the sh&re of Brazilian partners in 
existing joint ventures. Treatment in other imnortant 
matters, such as raw material imports and taxation, has 
never discriminated against wholly owned foreign subsid-
iaries.* 
It is a reasonable assumption that the normal 
preference of a business concern is to avoid partnership 
arrangements, since they involve inherent organizational 
and operational difficulties. This is true for joint ven-
tures in industrializei countries where entreure:neurial 
backgrounds and attitudes are fairly similar and eve:n more 
so in less developed nations where a I'leeting of the minds 
may be more difficult to achieve. Some of the major ~orob-
lem areas that can occur in joint business ventures 8,re: 
selection and succession in management; maintenance of 
quality and efficiency standards; financial matters such 
as dividend and reinvestment policy; pricing of com.nonents 
* Excluding any consideration of the 1962 expro-
priation of the ITT subsidiary in Rio Grande do Sul. Even 
here, however, a form of agreement on reimbursement was 
finally achieved. 
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supplied by the parent company; determination of technical 
assistance fees; allocation of product lines and exDort 
markets between parent company and the affiliates; and 
preservation of narent company control over highly :3pec-
ialized and unique technology. 
Table 8 summarizes the experience of the thirty-
six particina tin~ companies in joint venture opera t:ions. 46 
Nineteen of these companies have always adhered to the 
100% ownership policy in their :Srazilian o-perations. In 
17 cases there has been experience ··ri th joint ventures at 
one time or another, but only 13 of the 17 have beon sue-
cessful in their nartnership arrangements. This means 
that about one-third of the participating comnanies are 
currently operating in partnership with Brazilian interests. 
Most of the joint ventures in the s&mnle are 
majority controlled by the U.S. partners. Cnly in two 
cases does the Brazilian partner have control, and i.n one 
there is a 50-50 arrangement. Two of the r. S. co:rmc:1.nies 
involved in these three instances have other and more siz-
able joint ventures in which they exercise majority control. 
The table su .. r;~ests that joint ventures are typ-
ically a postwar development. Of the 13 participating 
companies that began operations prior to the second \Vorld 
46L. Gordon and E. Grommers, op.cit., p. 139. 
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TABIE 8 
Date of First Investment 
in Plant Facilities in 
Brazil 
Pi'e'vorl_d ___ Post -:;yor"JJ3-·--·-
war II Vlar II Total 
Total number of comnanies 13 23 36 
Only 11 per cent owned 
subsidiaries 
Joint venture at one time 
or another, of which: 
Joint venture fron the 
start 
Joint venture at l2ter 
date 
Joint venture at outset, 
but partnership 
terminated 
11 
2 
2 
8 19 
15 17 
11 11 
2 
4 4 
SOT.ffiG:-t:: L. Gordon and E.L. Grommers, United States I-'anu-
fa~.:~ __ urin.Ji_I~ves~E3_nt in_ J?_~a._~_iT;-T:tlarv1fra TF11ver-
sity, Boston, 1962}. 
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vVar, 11 have always maintained a 100% ovrnership nolic:r. 
The two exceptions are companies that started out on a 
1vholly ovvned basis but decided to accent local particina-
tion during the early 1950's. One of these firms then 
issued one-third of its capital to the public, while the 
other preserved its original oneration as a viholly owned 
subsidiary, but incorporated a new pls.nt sel_)aratel,y vri th 
49~~ participation b;y the Brazilian public. On the other 
hand, two-thirds of the coNpanies that entered the Braz-
ilian scene vdth manufacturing operations in the T)Ostwar 
period started out with nartnership arran«ements. 
As in the Argentine instance (see section 5.2.), 
the basic motives inducinc; a U.S. com:p2.n7 to e:n<J"~.Lcr,e' in a 
joiht venture cc1.re partly of a "business" and partly of a 
rtpoli tical" nature. The former incltu'l.es thtc; a"i_v~m ta~ses 
of reduced canital outlay and local operHting know-how 
and the latter assumes that some form of partnership ar-
ran,.7ement will lessen the imp,:;.ct a,gFdnst nationalistic 
pressures of one or another variety. These motives ap-
parently have becm more important for the com_ranies that 
caT"le into Brazil in the postwar years than for the Garlier 
established grov_p. The latter had the advanta,·e of a 
gradual start, buildinrr, up a reservoir of manpower ElXner-
ienced in local oner::o~.tions and financi2.l reserves to 
cover the local costs of subseq_nent ex~Jansion. ~rhe postwar 
investors, on the other hand, entered the scene in a per-
iod of rapid industrialization, often under time nres~m.re. 
They ·were forced generc~lly to establish immedia tel~r :;Jro-
c1uctive facilities on a substantial sole. In addition, 
they were unable to train manpovmr graduc:,.lly and to e.c-
cumulate financie"l reserves through initial ~Lsse:mbly c:md 
partial manuf:::.:-cturing onera tions. Consequently, their 
need for obte.inine; local capital and know-hovv and physical 
facilities through partnership arrangements vms more acute. 
The "politicaln motives for enga.O'ing in joint 
ventures do not appe:::tr to have constitue:.l a m<:.jor motive 
in any decision of a participating com·8any to accept the 
partnership princi nle. This IDE.y refl::;ct tho f~?.ct that, 
while economic nationalism has been quite stronn: in Brazil 
a~ainst foreign investors in the extrJ.ctive .nd public 
utility industries, it has not been felt si~1.ificc:;.ntly in 
the field of manufacturing for the ciomestic market. 47 
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47rt is interesting to note the results of a pub-
lic oninion noll conducted on behalf of c.:. vehicle nanufc~cturer 
a..nd reported- in Brazilian :Business, Februs.ry 1958. 'flhe. 
purpose V18.S to ascertaTn-the degree of receptivity to for-
eign caDits.l. rrhe results, which must be intGrpret':'d with 
csution since no information wc.,s given on samplin,_:s ~.;:;.nd 
interviewing techniques, \vere that 35% of the :1ersons intur-
vie•.:ed '.7ere entirely favorable to foreign inyestmenf 131S 
thou.ght it offers more adve::.nts .. ges than disadvz,~ntc..:·.ges; 7% 
believed th:-1t little ,9~ood would come from it; 16% did not 
like it at all and 27% hadno opinion. Signific<.:.tntly, one 
out of every four persons in the fully neg.tive group found 
the idea tolerable if foreign investment cooper<ol.tes ·;d th 
local canital. (As in the original source, these figures 
add up to only 98%.) · 
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In the automotive industry, three of the four u.s. 
vehicle manufacturers maintain complete ownershin as a 
matter of b::..sic company policy. ·:rhe fourth has local par-
ticipation, but through vvidespread individual shareholders 
rather than partnership with 2.n existing enterprise. The 
manufacturers of parts, on the contr~.ry, gener ll,y nave en-
ga.ged in joint ventures with previously existing local 
industrial concerns. A number of factors may account for 
this difference in a~Jproach. First of all, Brazil possessecii 
before 1956 a locally owned industry in certain automotive 
parts for the replacement market. \Vhen the U.S. parts 
manufacturers moved to :Brazil, where they had to develop 
production quickly to meet the GEIA nationalization sched-
ule (section 3.1.), cooper~tion with these pre-existing 
companies offered distinct advantages. \vhere no local man-
ufacturer could be found, a producer of related products 
vrho had experience 1vi th the required techniCJ.1Jes such as 
:forsing or fovndry nork, was often available. On the other 
hand, there wo.s no domestic automotive vehicle nanuf:cturing 
in Brazil and no other industry of comparable character 
prior to the GEIL. prog-ru.m. 
;\.nother discernible trend is that where relatively 
little capi t<:ll investment is requirea. and technology is 
the m.ain asset of a .1.irm, participating comuanies oroved 
somewhat hesJ. tc.nt to accept local partnershJ.p. h. chemicc:-:..1 
cor,lpany, for example, which ma.nufactures a nu.."'llber of highly 
specialized compounds in one of its Brazilian subsidiaries, 
feels thc:~t to accept partnership would be tantamount to 
giving someone a "free ride." Undoubtedly, a series of 
probing depth interviews vvould uncover a multi tude of other 
motives affecting the choice between exclusivity and ~art­
nership, some of them probably not completely rational, 
and some differing from the avo7:ed arguments. In the 
Harvard study some of the strongest opnosition to joint 
ventures vvas encountered among companies th::Lt had no dir-
ect experience with this form of operation. In the case 
of the four particinatinc; companies whose joint ventures 
failed, they did not consider this experience a reason 
to refrain from forming partnerships in the future. They 
emphasized instead the importance of gre :.t care in the 
selection of local nartners. Particul:J.rly, they stressed 
the need to avoid ~romoters who lacked real entrepreneur-
ial motivations and firms that are too small or have too 
~ittle to offer in the way of managerial or technical 
skills. 
PART IV 
CONCLUSION 
As 1963 began, t.rgentina and Brazil, both of 
which have been able to attract sizable amoQ~ts of private 
U.S. investment capi te.l, were in poor financial shape and 
dan_,:serously close to political and, perhap;3, social chaos. 
In a sense, the tvv-o countries are studies in contrastinG· 
moods. Argentina is in a deepening depression; Brazil 
is soaring on the upd.raft of a superinflation in which 
prices rise almost 5% a month. Thus, they seem to be at 
onuosite ends of a manic-depressive scale. But much of 
their trou11le stems from the same sov.rce: a squandering 
of their resources in an obsessive ~1sh to industrialize. 
This headlong leap toward the industris.l ·world i :', in :oart, 
a natural conse~uence of national r)ride. But this 1)ride 
has been misused by misguided and self-seeking Dolitical 
leaders, v1ho have comniled in both countries, an nnenvi-
able record of economic btmgling. Thus, U.s. investors 
in both Argentina and Brazil must realize that no amount 
of managerial maninulation or skill can maintain for lons 
a business enterprise vvhich rmst operate in an atmosDhere 
heavily charR"ed with nationalism and lackin-R" in resnonsible 
{, -· ... ) -~ 
economic and political leadership. 
Last fall Brazi+ ran completely out of foreign 
exchsno_:e. This year as much as S900 million in outside 
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capital and credits riill be required to kee1) the nation 
froa totgl economic chaos. Private forej_.<:;n investment 
coming into the country dropped from $270 million in 1961 
to an estime.ted :~62 million in 1962. In 1963 the totsl 
may drop as low as ~320 million. 48 If it does, one najor 
contributino; factor will be the 1962 le:co;is1ation Y.r!lich 
restricted the renatriation of profits. The law in effect 
limits profits to 10% of invested canitq1. This can be 
either re·patrio.ted or reinvested. Profit~' "beyond lOas can 
be out back into the bt'siness, bv_t they cannot oe used to 
incre:::'.se the capitalization. base upon v.rhich Sll.bsr::;,·~v.ent 
profit takin.<:; will be rn.oasv.red. In October 1962, all re-
missions of profits, royal ties. t~.nd loan payments were 
ha.l ted rmtil each foreie,n subsidiary becomes registered 
and investigr,.ted by the government. 49 
A.rgentina is in a depression that is both econ-
omic and emotional. In March 1962, Argentine military 
lea~1ers denosed President Arturo Frondizi and renle.cec1 hirn 
vvith a pu.ppet government headed by Jose I':Iaric=c r;.uido, then 
presir~ent of the Senate. This coup 1J.11(3.errr>.:i.ne 1:~ :lome ,::;tic 
;:;.nd intern2.tional confirJ.ence in what was already a shaky 
economic structnre. In the ensuing t'7elve months b't..1.siness 
49 Tbid., p. 64. 
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and commercial c-1cti vt tv has contracted scriouslv in the 
~ . ~) 
mic1st of a -:'Jsrverse or ice infle, tion. ·:rhe '~overn!''mt, with 
an e::.lnost e:rnpty treasury, has been h::tr~1 pressed to :r1.eet 
its mv:n pa;yr·ol1s, 1.,rhile t>..r~r:;e:ntine business has ,_:;one a:floc-1t 
on largely unbacked I.O.U.'s and postdated checks. llhe 
bankrul)tcy re:tte has increase:J severely; uner::<Jlo;yT:ent has 
mounted; and real wages h<3.Ve declined. ?rom 1958 to mid-
1962, the cost of living went up roughly 300;0. 50 
In S}Ji te of these difficulties, sor1e businesses 
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are v1ea therin.c:; the storm. Sales by Johnson's -vax f_r.c::entina 
have gone un from an estimated $200,000 to :32 million in 
five years. G.E., Ford and International Harvester, among 
th 1 h . d th . . t t . ' . . 51 o ers, a so ave lncre:.:_se e1r 1nves men s 1n ·~r:senlJlna.-
However, some of these new investments vrere connected vd th 
~rojects too far along to stop, A fev others think this 
is a _c;_·ood time to ,O"et a lot for their dollars. In Brazil's 
-· . __ ..) 
bustling Sao Paulo, the head of a 1ar.ge American affil-
iate beams as he tells of ~Jroduction 11 ri,c:::ht 2. ~~::,inst the 
pin,"5 2 then chane;es expression as he a.:lmits, ni've :!;ot 
money lec;.king out all over the place.:r 
Vie·wed in 1963 the best _grounds for hoDe in Brazil 
or Argentina c2"n, perhalJS, be exemplified by some remarks 
5°Fortune, Febr~ary 1963, p. 70. 
51Ibid., p. 72. 
52Fortune, r-Tarch 1963, p. 64. 
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expressed recently by President Guido.53 He recalled a 
visit to Argentina the French statesman, <, George Clemenceau, 
made in 1910. After touring the country and talking to 
its leaders, Clemenceau was asked his oninion of the 
country. According to Guido, he replied, "I have decided 
that the Argentine people are like a cork. No matter hovr 
much their les,ciers :push them down, they will always rise 
.. 
to the surf2.ce. " '<' Strange v10rds to be q_tnted by a coun-
try's President, but in La tin America one must tc::Jce r2;ys 
of hope where they ce:-;.n be found. 
53 Ibid • , p • 7 3 • 
APPEI'~Dr: A 
T ' -,~, mr'>l\T ( 'Rrf-"'l'J'nllTl) .h. \ ... '·!_1 Vl.~ :-~ 1 . ..r.D ~ 'L ~ -i_ 
1. Direct Taxes - General Character and Incidence 
Under the J\rgentine Constitution, the ris;ht to 
levy direct taxes and the exclusive rit;ht to levy import 
duties are delegated to the National Congress. In prac-
tice, the income tax, excess profits tax, capital gains 
tax, sales tax, excise taxes, and the tax in substitution 
of the tax on gratuitous transfers of property are nat-
ional in scope. The stamp tax, the tax on gratuitous 
transfers of property and the real property tax levied 
by the National Conc'-',Tess are applicable to the 1<--,eders.l 
District and Na ticnal rrerri tories (i.e., territories gov-
erned by the National Government). '::hese latter t8.xes and 
the municipal taxes for the Federai District sre illustra-
tive of similar taxes levied by provincial and municipal 
authorities in other parts of the country. In some in-
stances (e.g., Stamp Tax) these local taxes can be of con-
siderable significance. 
Argentina has at present no general convention 
with the United States for the avoidance of double taxa-
tion. By an exchange of notes on July 20, 1950, the two 
governn1ents reached an agreement for the avoidance of double 
taxation on the e<trnings derived from the operation of 
ships and aircraft. 
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2. Tax on Capital 
_________ __-::._----n-
The tax on capital is also referreJ to as a tax 
in lieu of inheritance tax and as a substitute tax. It 
is levied c-~.~- inst domestic corpor::;.tions, foreiGn corpor-
ations or their brc::cnches vvhich carry on :)ermanent business 
in Argentina, and a.::;-2inst any other Jonestic conpanies of 
vvha tever ty-oe in which cs.pi tal is \'.'holly or partly for-
eign owned. 
Domestic cor}::or;::J.tions may be exempted from the 
tax to the extent that their capital is represented by 
nominative as O}Yoosed to bearer shares, but, in this case, 
the holder becomes subject to gift and inheritance taxes. 
Forei:gn corporn. tions do not receive this exemption. Dam-
estic concerns other than corporations that are wholly or 
partly foreign owned are subject to the tax to the degree 
that their capital and free reserves are foreign owned. 
The tax is 1% Der year on capital <:.'..nd free reserves, as 
computed for excess profits tax, at the close of the fiscal 
year. The tax may be considered a deduction in com..-mting 
income ta:x:. 
3. Sales T1ax 
A sales tax is levied on the first s2le of ~oods 
Droduced or WJ..nufactured in Argentin2 or imported into or 
exnorted from Argentina. The tax is 85~ of net sales :1rice, 
It is reduced to 1.25% on sales of petrole~un 0roducts. 
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Nv.merous domesticc:lly produc·ed c1rticles e.re ex-
empt from the sc:.les tax. '~hese pro:lucts include coal, 
pharmaceutic_.ls, unprocessed C.?;ricultural, livestock and 
forestry· products, nany foodstuffs, fuel an::l other i terns 
o1· bs.sic necessity. The President may reduce the r2.- -te, 
grant additional exceptions in the interest of the national 
economy, or may increase the rate to ''" r1E: .. ximum of 30%. 
The law imposes, in addition to the 8% sales tc-.1.x, 
a tax of 4~S on the sales price of c::~utomobiles, li2;ht 
trvcks, jeeps and motorcycles. IvianufGl.c -curers, producers, 
imnorters and exporters are responsible for the collection 
of the tGl.x. 
4. Excise Tax 
The Federal Government also levies excise taxes, 
effective throughout Argentina, on tobacco, alcohol, alco-
holic beverages, matches, lighters, insurance premiums, 
petroleum fuels and lubricants, playing cards, beer and 
malt bevera-;e concentrates, wines, toilet articles, nneu-
matic tires, real and artificial silk thread and cloth, 
sugar and luxu_ry articles. 
Excise tax rates vary greatly. In some cases, 
the rate of taxation is higher on inported articles than on 
domestic ones. Generally, the taxes do not apDly to art-
icles exported from Areentina; and the President has some 
authori tv to reduce and reinst?.te the rates c:.nd to zrant ~ J 
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5. Stamp Tax 
'J:lhe Federal stamp tax is ap~)licable to events 
occurring in or producing consequences in the Federal Dis-
trict. Certain documents are prepared on stamped paper 
or revenue stamps are affixed to documents on unstar'lned 
paper. 
Numerous v..rri tten contracts, evidences o:f debt, 
provisory instruments, ~s:uarantees, pledges c:1nd similar 
writings are subject to a tax at a rate of 1.5% on the 
amount of the transaction. For a partnership contract or 
similar agreement, the tax is levied on the amount of cap-
ital involved. 3ranches of foreim com;:)anies nav the tax 
._J - ·-'- ,_.. 
at the time they are inscribed in the Comrnercial Re~-sister. 
If the branch or agency has no capital or if the amo1-mt 
cannot be sa tisfe:-:.ctorily determined, the tax mv_st be ·_:greed 
on with the tax authorities. Receipts require tax stamps. 
Interest-bearing cash deposits, overdrafts, loans or ad-
vances in current account are taxable. Instr1J.ments r.';rant-
ing credits or authorizing overdrafts are subject to a 
further tax. 
Stamp taxes are levied on checks circulating 
within the jurisdiction of the place of issue; on author-
izations to withdraw funds from time denosit, to endorse 
checks for deposit to current account, or to write checks 
ag-c1inst the account; and on trust receipts. Domestic 
bills of exchange, drafts, money orders and similar 
instruments are also subject to the stamp tax. 
Applications to establish a domestic corporation 
or a branch or a~ency of a foreif!,D. corporation must be 
presented on stamped ~Japer. Such entities are also sub-
ject to an annual insnection fee. 
Other documents are also subject to the str.mp 
tax. Ap:)lica tions to adl;l.inistra tive and ,judicial a zencies, 
petitions, copies of nublic records, certificates, various 
shipping docLunents, judgments, notarial certificates, op-
tions and additional pages, copies amendments and rectifi-
cations are illustrative of the class subject to the tax. 
The various Provinces also collect stamp taxes 
at rates generally similar to those in force in the Fed-
eral District. 
6. Turnover rrax 
The turnover tax (contribuciones que_inciden 
sobre las actividades ~ los espectaculos publicos) apnlies 
to the privileee of exercising a commercial, industrial, 
professional or other regular activity for gain in the 
Federal District. The tax is levied on gross receiyts 
after minor deductions. It is interestirF; to note that 
the basic tax varies from 0.6 to 1% of the amount involved 
but rebates of up to 755·6 of the tax and surcharges of as 
much as 30 times the basic tax, varying accordin'S to the 
social and economic desirability of the activity, may 
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alter the basic tax greatly. Corporations pay a surcharge 
of 2~/o on the basic rate of tax. 
A hypothetical situation will be assumed, as 
realistic as possible, of a United 3tates-owne,~1 subsidiary 
corporation org:.nized under the laws of ;~,.r-:;entina and 
Brazil in or()_er to analyze the impact of the locftl income 
tax system on the profits of this hy~othetica corporation 
and on the dividends it declares. However, it should be 
made clear 2,t the outset that a comparison of income tax 
rates applicable in a ~ou1; of nations can never be com-
pletely equitable bee ,use of factors such as the followin:c;: 
(a) A nresentation of the rates apnlicable 
in an incoae tax system cannot show the 
shadings of those taxes ryhich result 
from the various kinds of deductions 
and exemptions nermi tted vri thin the 
system. 
(b) I'he over-all tax system in one country 
may give greater emphasis to taxes other 
than those on income, while in the other 
country the reverse may be true. 
(c) The variables are very much increased 
when one of the countries has excess 
-------------~------
*United Nations, Foreign Pr~~-:_~~~n'!_estrrtent in 
the Latin American Free-Trade ~rea, (New York, 1961), p.29. 
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profits taxes 1vi th the bc-:sis for comov_tin,-.. 
those taxes bein:-;- other then incOF'.e 
as computec1 for normal tax -,Jurposes 
ancl when :i_t is impossible to ev::'Llu-
ate the deg-ree of enforce:rT:mt of 
the t2cX lavv. 
However, because of the basic similarity in the 
over-all ta~c s::,rstern.s of !\.r(,;entina and 0razi1 certz~in valid 
conclnsions can be c1rsrvn if we first as~tune the follorrinc: 
(a) 3oth countries h2.ve the s,::,ne, or al-
most th·3 sr:me, deductions and exemp-
t:ions (where imnortant varialJles exist, 
they v'lill be shown). 
(b) The rates given are those gener8lly 
annlicable to locallv or,c-s~.n:i.zed cor-
.L- tl -
pora tions wholly ovmed b~r the non-res-
ident anil non-domiciled T7 • S. cornora-
tion. 
(c) All corporate income, after domestic 
taxes, is declared as dividends to 
the narent (u.s.) corporation and the 
over-all tax burden includes the for-
eign tax c-i.pplicable to those c'l_ivic'_ends. 
(d) It :if3 asstuled th2.t there is a nJ.etter 
of the law 11 enforcement of s.ll t2oxr::::s. 
(e) The corporation eL"'.rns ;)1 million of net 
taxable income in the tax year, which 
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norate ca:.,i tal is therefor(~ ::2.5 million • 
. ·~RGENTIEA 
Normal tax (at the rc;.te of 30;0 on profits 
,.., ··'1 "11" ) OI ·.~ IDl- lOll • • • 
Dividend tax (at the rc-:::.te of 8/n on ~:noo.,ooo 
- tot2.l nrofits less amount of normal 
tax 
• • • • • 
Excess profits taxa • 
Totc.l Taxes 
Total taxes as a percenta~e of net 
taxable income. • • • 
Taxes in 
doll8TS 
~300,000 
56,000 
117,000 
:)4 73 '000 
• 47.3% 
a It is a.ssumecl that the capi t 1 v_sed to produce 
income of :31 million is .) 2. 5 million.- Generally it- can be 
said that J\rgentina defines :9rofi ts as 11 exces:3 '' vrhen they 
exceed 12% of ca~ital. But the Argentina Excess Profits 
Tax Act (1959) provides that ca:oital, for e~:cess profits 
tax pur·poses, should also include 50;:~ of the net taxable 
profits earned d1..1.ring the year. Thus the nrimary basis 
for this comn'lJ_tation is 125~ of .33 million (cP~nital of .. )2.5 
million plus .:>. 5 million - which is 50;}b of the :'31 million 
of profits for the year), or 8360,000. Profits of $640,000 
would be termed "excess. 11 
bxcess profits would be tax9d, under Article 6, 
as follows: 
Excess -orofits Tax ner- Tax 
(in dollars) centaP,e (in dollars) 
First. • • 150,000 10 15,000 
Next • • 150,000 15 22,500 
Next . • 150,000 20 30,000 
Next • • 150,000 25 37,500 
Remaining 40,000 30 12,000 
:~640,000 Total excess ~3117 ,000 
nrofits tax· 
157 
Important Variables: Under Argentine law, an in<Justrial 
corporation may take a deduction agc::.inst normal tax income 
for an anount equ::::.l to 50% of the v ;.lue of 2.ddi tions \7hich 
it makes to fixed assets, :orovic1ed that the new investment 
reoresents a sum greB.ter tho.n 10;0 of the tax-oayer' s fixed 
assets at the beginning of the year. Consecuently, every 
dollar of net ta:G'ible }Jrofi ts invested in fixed assets, 
tmder the conditions described above, viould, in effect, 
be subject to a 15% normal tax rate instt:.:"~-<1 of the other-
wise prescribed rate of 30%. 
BRAZIL 
Normal rate (at the re.te of 23% 
on 81 million). • 
Dividend tax (at the rate of' 25% on 
$770,000 - total nrofits less amount 
of normal tax). • 
Excess profits taxb • • 
Total Taxes 
Taxes 
(in clol1ars) 
~5230' 000 
• 195,500 
50,000 
0472,500 
Total taxes as a percent:o1ge of net taxable income 4 7. 25;:0 
b Corpor::.:~ tions com-:mte their excess profits tax 
by conparing profits - as com-outed for the normal tax -
with any one of three bs,ses they choose: ( i) 307t of the 
"ca-pital effectively :.:: -:;IJlied" in the business which is 
defined as consisti~,<?, of paid-up capital, undistributed 
profits, and reserves, except those for contingencies; 
(ii) twice the average profits for the three-year neriod 
1947-1949; (iii) a sum equal to the total of the following 
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Import~nt_Variables: In lieu of the regular excess profits 
tax payment, the taxpayer may choose to deposit an amount 
eq_w::cl to 150% of the excess profits tax otherwise due in 
"'9rescri bed banks. Those are cal leG. "inves -,::;ment deposits." 
'.Vi th the -Jermis:Jicn of the Government's Investnent Coa":'lis-
sion, the derosits ccn be applied to ~rojects in the 
taxpayer's or in any other enter0rise considered <.::'.s fur-
thering national economic development. r:cre than likely 
this al terna ti ve would fit into the plans of the hy~Jothet-
ical corporation so that, in effect, the burden of excc:ss 
profits taxation would be elimin8.ted; totu.l te:L::es vrould 
then be $422,500; and the total taxes would be 42.25% of 
net taxable income instead of 47.25%. 
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b (cont.)percentae;es of annual gross income: 6% 
of the first 3.5 million cruzeiros of income, 5% of the next 
1. 5 million cruzeiros, and 4% of all remsining .gross income. 
For purposes of comparability the first of these 
three bases will be used. It is assumed that the cornora-
tion returns lJrofi ts of $1 million on cc.;.,ni tal of :)2. 5. mil-
lion. It is further assunod that this canital is equivalent 
to 1 Ca1Jital effectively a!J~Jlied," so that the b:c:cse for com-
puting- excess nrofits is 30)~ of :$2.5 million, or '3750,000. 
The Excess Profits Tax Act provides that profits 
greater in amount that the excess profits tax base are 
"excess." In this instance, it would mean that the cor-
"!JOration has excess profits of ~~250,000 (:Sl million minus 
$750,000). Since such profits do not exceed 50% of the 
excess profits tax base, they are subject to the lowest 
bracket rate of excess profits tax, vvhich is 20%. The 
tax would then be $50,000 (2~~ of $250,000). 
Brazil levies a 15% surcharge, which is in ef-
fect a forced loan to the government, on the amount of 
income and excess profits tax :oayable. Six years e,fter 
:oay:r;1ent of the surcharge, the taxpayer receives Economic 
Rehabilitation Bonds in the amount of 125% of the Dayments 
made. The bonds are liquidated in 20 equal annual install-
ments and bear interest at the rate of 5~. Because of 
the nature of this strrcharge, it has not been included 
in the tax comnutation. It would be necessc::-"ry to envisage 
a default of the bonds to do otherwise. 
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Al'PENDIX B 
TA '(;~TION ( 3RAZIL) 
1. Direct Taxes - General Character and Incidence 
Taken as a whole, the Brazilian systern of taxa-
tion is regarj_ed by U.S. manufacturing investors as neither 
extremely harsh nor extremely li berc.:.l. '":_lhe nroblems ':osed 
by ·it arise for the most D':J.rt not from the tax structure 
or rates as such, but from the effect of the inflationary 
environment on tax liabilities. !:'he tax system has also 
affected the or.g:"miza tion of foreiQ1 manufa.ctn::':'ing affil-
ia tes ancl. has influenced a number of im:Jortant business 
decisions. 
In Brazil, as in most u.nderdevelo-r•ed cotmtries, 
indirect taxes account for considerably more tF:.x revenue 
than do direct taxes. On the federal level, the yield 
from direct taxes (on income and estates) is only one-
half of that from indirect taxes (on consumr~tion, imports, 
t ) d •.p 'h e c. , an- 1~ ~ e states are include::, this relE',tionshi'' 
becomes on<? to three.* 
~he main fea ttu'es of the federEl corn orate in-
come tax structure are as foll~vs: (a) a business income 
tax of 20;'0 :Jlus a surcharge of 3';0 since 1959, maldnz a 
* Derived from data in :_nntlal 
istics ( 1961). 
~razilian St8.t-
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total of 2Jj; ("b) a con'ulsor;y refillldaole lean ( bec--:;.:r·inc; 
interest at 5%) to the Fational Economic :!)evelo>rn.ent :Bank 
of 15~ of the ~Jsiness income tax paid, and an additional 
4~~ of all illldistribv.ted profits; (c) a ?!"'Oc:;:r'e:3sive excess 
profits tax of ?.0 to 50% on the amount by which ··rofi ts 
e:xceed the "b2sic ~'rofi ts"; * (d) a :s>enal ty tB.'( o:f JO;i on 
accumulation of reserves in excess of l'aid-in ca·ni tal ( ,,uy-
ment of which may be avoided, however, by canitalizin3 
reserves :c~nd un·Jistri buted profits instead at a lc,':tEn' te.:;.~ 
rate of 15/~). 
In addition, branches of nonres:L•.:ent cor-,orD.tions 
thc::.t o.re do ins business in Brazil are subject to a ·.·,-i th-
holding tax of 25% on all income received, whether rerritted 
2broad or not. .l?orei o.n s1.i'osidiari'' s incor:nort:t tecl in 
Brazil, on the other hand., are liabL:" for this iJi tilholc"iin!j 
tax only on income renitted abroad. 
The total im-oact of these direct taxes on c~;-ross 
* !;he bs.sic ;'Jrofi t may be com·;ute 1., c.~t th<J 
choice of the taxnayer, as 30~ of the ca-oital effectively 
eFmlove;l in the business or 25"0 of t1B same i:f lo~c>.n can-
- "' ' 
i te.l is included; or as a given ~)ercentc:.se, ~;ro':~ ~: ;'3 T:i.vely 
computed, of sross annual income. A ::Jrogres:-:dve to.x is 
ap-olied to profits in excess of this base as follows: 
Excess of urofits over bsse 
------~--·--·--""'-··-----------
Up to 50;;~ 
50;1o to lOO)s 
1001-~ to 200:;~ 
above 200;;s ' 
Tax rate 
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profits lies, according to the estiuates of v2rious par-
ticirJatins; comnanies (in the Harvard st1J.dy), some'.~here 
within the range of 30 to 70';.S. ':Chis de··•encls on the degree 
-
of profitability of the oper&tions, on the comp2ny's ~ol-
icy regar,ling reinvestnent of earnings, o..n,5_ to some extent 
on the age of the subsidiary, since excess reserves tax 
liability does not occur until there has been time to 
build a surplus. On the v:hole, this. tax l:n1r:ien wo..s con-
siclered re<"ison. bl·~ by the ~)articip;-3. tin.=>: firms, but they 
did identify a number of snecific problems. (It should 
be noted that the vieVls of U.S. investors on the general 
level of "Jrazilian ta~cation are naturally affected by the 
level of direct taxes in the United States and by the oper-
at ion of our foreisn tax credit syste!Il. Some Enro<Jean 
investors in '3razil are renorted to consider the ·=;eneral 
tax burden there as a sic:-91-ificant deterrent to their ex-
nansion.) 
A minor mesns of influencin~ industrialization 
throwT,h ta~c nolicy is found in the trec:~tment of royql ties 
and tcchl1ic''.Ll assistance fees paid to narent corrmanies. 
Such payments are deductible from tsxable income of the 
Brazilian subsidiary; but in 1959 the c1eductions were lim-
i ted to cert:::,in maximUIT: percentc;. :ses of ::~Toss sales. c~he 
maximum is set at 5;~ for such essential indl)_stries as com-
munica tions, automotive products, a.7ricultural and road-
buildins machinery, mining ancl. proces:3ing equinment, 
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fertilizers und bEt sic chemicals; at 4/b for -rharmacet:tticals, 
textiles, -pack~;_,;incs na terials, etc. ; at yfo for office 
machines, domestic apDliances, etc.; at 2;6 for products 
such as toothpe,ste and soa:o; c_:~:o_d at only 1% for "other 
trc:~nsformation industries. 11 This schedule cle:::1rly rlrovides 
some preference for licensing arrangements in the raore es-
sential branches of industry. 
2. State Sales Tax 
The state sales tax varies amon;-; the sts-"tes, 
generally rangin~ bet~een 3 and 5~. This tax is levied 
on nractically all sales; in the case of intersto:t te com-
merce it is :9ayable in the state of the seller. ?he bssic 
nroblem for a nanufacturer arises from the fact that the 
sales taz is e:-::.n'•lie\. in full to every sale of ::=.t:n i tern on 
its way from raw material to the end product, inste~cl of 
being be:- sed only on the value added s. t each stage of manu-
facture. Accordin:; to several of the cor:r.)anies in the 
study, this situation has tended to bring abovt ez:cessive 
vertical j_nte,gra tion where it was economicslly not vmr-
ranted. This le<:~,ds to unnecessary duplic<=t tion in com'0onent 
production s.nd impedes the growth of inde:oencl.ent locally 
ovmed supnliers. In addition, the system tends to vrork 
in favor of larc;e companies that can afford vertical in-
tegration and against small firms that s.re unable to do so, 
in narticular in such industries as chemic2vls 'Nhere a raw 
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materL,~l may go through me.ny sta.ges before the final J)ro-
duct is turned out. Since foreign-ovmed fir:r:Js are finan-
cially stronger than their Br2.zilian competitors, the 
syutcm may tend to fs.vor foreisn investors. 
The constitutional provision that interste:~ te 
s::,les are subject to sales tax only in the state of the 
seller has been clarified by a federal larr, .;hich _provides 
that even if goods produced in one state are sold in an-
other by a sales branch or ccgency of th8 producer, the 
s:.-1les t'~;: is due only to the producer stcJ.te. This federal 
rule has not always been honor2d by those ste;,tes that are 
large consumers of items produced in other states. The 
resu~ting difficulties are illustrated by a participating 
company in the Harvard study ,-.;hich wc:.s encs-a.gDd in nation-
wi:ie distribution of its products. '2he company for::-:wrly 
operc.c. ted warehouses '3.11 over the country, from which whole-
salers and retailers were sup_9lied. The st"ctcs '.'/here the 
wa.rehouses were located claimed the sales tax, which had 
already been paid to the manufacturin?; stats. No solution 
could be found to -out an end to this :i.ouble taxation 2~nd 
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the warehouse system was abandoned as soon as tr~ns~crta­
tion ~~cilities between factory and outlying s~les districts 
had improved sufficiently to -oring delivery periods 1-d thin 
re<:tsonable limits. 
Sales taxes tend to be highest in the poorer 
states, which sre most in need of incJ.ustrializa tion, and 
the sane is true for the "business taxes 11 levieci in the 
county ( munici nio) level. It does not apne;c~r, however, 
that these tax differentials have been s sL:-;nificant factor 
in detcrminin;:s the location of manufacturing sites by the 
participating companies. 
3. J''oderal Consurrmtion Tax 
--·-·-·-------··-~--~---';!:.--- .... ---·--
The other main indirect tax is tho federal excise 
or consum-ption tu.x ( i~po_st~_de ~~sum~). This is levied 
on all goods manufactured in ur imnorted into Brazil, vvi th 
the exception of fuel, electric power c:-md :iomestic miner-
als, vthich are subject to a "unified tax" ( imposto lmico), 
and a number of specially exempted products such as agri-
cultural implements and machinery. The rs tes vc.try between 
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2 and 5~ with most m::::_nufactured i toms in the 4 to 6% bracket. 
Until 1958 the excise tax was levied in full on 
each manufacturinc; stage in a separate location that con-
stituted a "transformation 11 rather than a mere 11 imDrove-
ment. a This provided a distinct incentive fo;.~ inte~c;ra tion 
of :!Jroduction at one :rlant site. A tire manufc1.cturer par-
ticipating in the study reported that the excise ta~·: Dre-
vented the company from decentr~clizin·~ its 00'Jr ;tions by 
moving its fabric mill to another location, ::·. ste the.: t was 
highly desirable because of congestion in the orir:;inal 
plant. Like the state sales tax, this arrangement was also 
a deterrent to outside purchases of components. In a tax 
reform in 1958 the excise tax was shifted to a base of 
"value added," thereby eliminating these disadvn.ntageous 
features. 
LTerch~mdise is considered taxable as soon as it 
moves from the factory to a warehouse. ·~his means that 
an additional amount of vrorking capital, which for most 
manuf,,.ctrtrers lies somewhere between 4 and 6s of th::c' sell-
in:; price, may be tied up for several months, de pen dint; 
on the speed rri th vrhich a manufc;.cturer moves his inven-
toriGs of finished goods. 
4. Municipal Business Taxes 
These taxes are collected on the county level. 
Temporary vrdvers or reductions of such ta~{es h2ve been 
used_ by many counties as an incentive to nevv investors. 
It seems doubtful that the~Je remissions have gTe~-~tly in-
fluenced the choice of location, which is based on more 
important factors such as availability of labor, trans-
portation and reliable public utili ties. ·~he im:•Jact of 
local business t~c;,xes ap1Jears to have been more substr:1nti2.l 
in a negative direction. Some companies in the st1 1 dy re-
ported that the;y have been forced to close down sales 
offices in certain munici~Jali ties because local business 
taxes ',7ere unreason;'~bly increased. Problems similar to 
those mentioned in connection with the state sales tax 
were also encountered. Several instances were uncovered, 
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also, of an attempt to collect local business taxes (as-
sessed as a nercentage of turnover) not only on the sales 
handled by the local sales office, but, in adcU tion, on 
sales made by other deuartments of the com~any in other 
locations. 
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